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Editorial Note
As Chief Editor, I am pleased to introduce this second issue of the open
access interdisciplinary journal on issues related to sustainable development in
African states. IJAD is an outcome of successful international conferences on
sustainable African development since 2001. The journal aims to serve as a
scholarly forum for dialogue, research, and knowledge necessary for policy and
institutional reforms to enhance sustainable development, good governance and
human rights and peace in African states with implications for other developing
states. Since good governance is a critical cross cutting concept, the journal
solicits papers with a focus on good governance, though it welcomes submissions
in all other themes. Governance has political, economic, institutional, and
leadership dimensions. Governance is defined as the institutions and rules by
which political authority is exercised, including how governments at all levels are
selected and monitored, and their capacity to effectively formulate and implement
policies that provide public services for citizens. Sustainable development is
multidimensional process involving economic development, advancement of
human capabilities, environmental and human security, richer cultural life and
greater political and social freedom including freedom of expression. I am pleased
to introduce the second issue of five papers for Spring 2014 that focus on topics
and issues including maternal education and child nutrition, China’s growing
trade with African states, occupational minorities, the rise and fall of American
soft diplomacy, and environmental stress and vulnerability based on case studies
of an African country.
Sisay Asefa
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Maternal Education, Linkages and Child Nutrition in the Long and Shortrun: Evidence from the Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys
Ambel Alemayehu Azeze, World Bank
Wei-Chiao Huang,* Western Michigan University
Abstract: We used the 2000 and 2005 Ethiopian Demographic and Health Surveys
to analyze the effect of maternal education and its pathways on chronic (long-run)
and acute (short-run) malnutrition in Ethiopia. The pathways examined in this study
are socioeconomic status, maternal health-seeking behavior, maternal knowledge
of health and family planning and reproductive behavior. We find that maternal
education works through all except health-seeking behavior. We also find that
maternal education and its pathways are more relevant and robust in explaining
chronic than acute malnutrition. Socioeconomic status is the most important factor
linking maternal education and child nutritional status. Although girls’ education
is a high policy priority, it may take time before its direct and indirect impacts
materialize and substantially improve child health outcomes. Faster results would
require direct interventions on key elements of socio-economic status.

1. Introduction
The strong relationship between maternal education and child health outcomes is widely
documented and largely undisputed (Frongillo & Hanson, 1997; Variyam et al., 1999; Alderman
et al., 2000; Smith and Haddad, 2000). A large body of literature documents that maternal
education works through a number of pathway variables that directly affect child health outcomes.
The list includes a number of maternal, household, and community characteristics such as
socioeconomic status, geographic residence, nutritional and health knowledge, autonomy, and
health-seeking and reproductive behavior (Desai & Alva, 1998; Glewwe, 1999; Webb & Block,
2004; Frost, Forste, & Haas, 2005).
Therefore, the pure impact of education on child health is greatly attenuated when selected
mediating factors are included in the model. However, there is a broad disagreement on the role of
the various linkages through which the impacts of maternal education on child health outcomes
are transmitted. Moreover, it is noted that the impact of maternal education could be different to
different measures of child nutritional status (Webb & Block, 2004).
This study models selected pathways linking maternal education and child nutritional status
in Ethiopia using the 2000 and 2005 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys (EDHS). The
study investigates how maternal education and its various pathways affect chronic (height for age)
and acute (weight for height) malnutrition in children younger than five years. The study addresses
the following three questions: (1) Does maternal education work through selected pathways such
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as socioeconomic status, maternal health-seeking behavior, and maternal knowledge of family
planning and health? (2) How do maternal education and its pathways perform in models of
different types of child malnutrition? (3) What are the policy and program implications?
The study is motivated by some recent developments on child nutritional status in Ethiopia.
First, the 2005 EDHS shows significant improvement in child nutritional status when compared to
the results of the preceding survey conducted in 2000. Second, the changes have been different for
different types of child malnutrition. Chronic malnutrition declined while acute malnutrition
remained the same on average (Central Statistical Authority, 2001; ORC Macro, 2006). Third,
the availability of comparable data would provide an opportunity to investigate the performance
of the determinants of child nutritional status over time. Fourth, malnutrition is a leading cause of
child death in developing countries (Black, Morris & Bryce, 2003), and reducing child mortality
is among the top priorities included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Because
prevalence of child malnutrition and infant mortality in Ethiopia is among the highest in
developing regions, the issue is of national and international concern.
Previous studies on child nutritional status in Ethiopia focused on identifying the
determinants of chronic malnutrition from a one-time survey (Girma & Genebo, 2002) or without
sufficient consideration of the impact of education in various contexts (Christiaensen & Alderman,
2004). Our study expands the discussion in two ways. First, the study analyzes the effect of
maternal education on child nutritional status considering a more comprehensive array of linkages.
Second, the study considers both chronic and acute malnutrition.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief summary of previous
studies. Section 3 provides a background on the prevalence and recent changes in child nutritional
status in Ethiopia. Section 4 describes the multivariate analysis including the empirical framework
and the data. Section 5 discusses the results, followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Previous Studies
Education determines health knowledge and other socioeconomic outcomes that are
essential to child health. Therefore, the quest for the links through which maternal education
influences child health has been an important area of research and policy dialogue (Desai & Alva,
1998; Frost, Forste & Haas, 2005). The pathways considered usually include nutritional
knowledge, health knowledge, socioeconomic status, attitude toward modern health care services,
autonomy, and reproductive behavior, and even place of residence (Desai & Alva, 1998; Glewwe,
1999; Frost Forste, & Haas, 2005).
The inquiry to the relationship between maternal education and its pathways has touched
on several aspects of the issue. One of these concerns is the relationships between formal
schooling and nutritional and health knowledge (Glewwe, 1999; Webb & Block, 2004). Glewwe
(1999) argues that there exist three possible mechanisms through which formal schooling
influences maternal health knowledge. First, future mothers directly acquire health knowledge
6
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from formal schooling. Second, the literacy and numeracy skills acquired in school assist future
mothers in diagnosing and treating child health problems. Third, exposure to modern society
through formal schooling makes women more receptive to modern medical treatments. Based on
data from Morocco, Glewwe finds that “mother’s health knowledge alone appears to be the crucial
skill for raising child health.” He then suggests that health education should be directly taught in
schools at a young age so that girls will have some knowledge even if they drop out of school
early.
The multidimensional impacts that education and its pathways have on child health
outcome are far from trivial. Important connections exist not only between maternal education and
its linkages but also between the linkages themselves. Socioeconomic status affects healthseeking behavior by facilitating access to modern health care utilization. Socioeconomic status
also enhances maternal nutritional and health knowledge. Nutritional knowledge may also
augment the impact of income or socioeconomic status on child health.
Christiaensen and Alderman (2004) explore the role of maternal nutritional knowledge in
augmenting the impact of income on child stunting in Ethiopia. In their study, maternal nutritional
knowledge is measured by the “community’s diagnostic capability of growth faltering.” Using
data from three consecutive welfare-monitoring surveys over the period 1996–1998, they find that
that household resources, food prices, and parental education are key determinants of child
malnutrition. Most importantly, Christiansen and Alderman show that maternal nutritional
knowledge plays an important role in the determination of child malnutrition.
The available findings on the relationships between maternal education and child health
are also challenged by the choice of a proxy for child health. Unlike most of the literature that does
not discriminate between types of malnutrition, Webb and Block (2004) investigate the effect of
formal schooling and mother’s nutritional knowledge on chronic and acute malnutrition. Using
data from rural Central Java, Indonesia, Webb and Block argue that it is critical to distinguish the
effects of formal schooling from the effects of specific nutrition knowledge. Their findings show
that formal schooling is more responsive to long-term malnutrition than short-term. They also note
that formal schooling is among the important sources of nutrition knowledge.
Another aspect of the debate on maternal education and child nutritional status deals with
the effectiveness of the links. Some studies argue that the effect of maternal education on child
health is fully mediated by selected pathways. For instance, Desai and Alva (1998) analyze the
effect of maternal education on three measures of child health: infant mortality, height for age, and
immunization status. Based on the first round of DHS data from 22 developing countries, they
argue that education is a proxy for socioeconomic status and geographic residence. Therefore, they
argue that, when these variables are incorporated in the model, the effect of maternal education
largely disappears and only retains its significance in “a handful of countries.”
However, recent evidence shows that the direct effect of education remains significant in
fully specified models. In this regard, Frost, Forste, and Haas (2005) consider a more
International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014
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comprehensive list of pathway variables. Using data from the 1998 Bolivian DHS, they examine
selected pathways, including “socioeconomic status, health knowledge, modern attitudes toward
health care, female autonomy, and reproductive behavior” (p. 400).1 They find that socioeconomic
factors are the most important pathways linking education and child nutritional status. They also
find that the effect of maternal education remains significant after controlling for all pathway
variables as well as geographic regions and place of residence.
The review presented here is brief, focusing only on major debates regarding maternal
education and child health outcomes. However, at least two observations can be noted from the
on-going debate. First, although the role of maternal education on child health outcome is obvious,
there is a broad disagreement on the channels through which maternal education influences child
health in the long term (chronic case) and the short term (acute case). Second, most of the
empirical evidence is on chronic than acute malnutrition. This study aims to add to the existing
literature by considering the effect of maternal education and selected pathway variables on
chronic and acute child malnutrition in Ethiopia.

3. Background: Child Nutritional Status in Ethiopia
The conventional measures of child anthropometrics show that the prevalence of child
malnutrition in Ethiopia is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2003, 52% of children
were suffering from chronic malnutrition (stunting), 11% from acute malnutrition (wasting), and
47% from underweight. During the same period, the average prevalence of stunting, wasting, and
underweight for African countries were 39%, 9%, and 29%, respectively. A recently completed
survey in Ethiopia, the 2005 EDHS, shows a similar profile of under-five malnutrition (Table 1).
Another important feature of child nutritional status in Ethiopia is that the prevalence can
be distinguished by selected background characteristics. Table 1 presents the prevalence of child
nutritional status by maternal education and place of residence in 2000 and 2005. It shows that the
incidednce of malnutrition among children whose mothers have some education is lower than those
whose mothers with no education. The percent of children malnourished consistently declines as
the highest level of education attained by the mother increases from no education to primary
education, and then to secondary and higher education. The trend is consistent across different
indicators of child malnutrition and survey years.

1

All except reproductive behavior are constructed by principal component analysis from a number of related variables
included in the Bolivian DHS. Each pathway incorporates several interrelated indicators. For instance, socioeconomic
status is measured by household wealth (owning a television, radio, refrigerator, or phone) and household environment
(electricity, piped water, flush toilet, and non-dirt floor) (see Frost, Forste, and Haas, 2005, p. 400)
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Table 1. Child Malnutrition by Maternal Education and Place of Residence

Background
Maternal education
No education
Primary
Secondary & higher
Place of residence
Urban
Rural
Total

% of children suffering from
Stunting
Wasting
Underweight
%
%
%
2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change 2000 2005 Change
52.9 49.1
49.1 39.8
32.9 24.0

-7.2 11.4 11.2
-18.9 8.8 10.1
-27.1 6.7 1.3

-1.8 49.6 41.4
14.8 40.4 32.0
-80.6 27.7 13.6

-16.5
-20.8
-50.9

42.3 29.8
52.6 47.9

-29.6 5.5 6.3
-8.9 11.1 10.9

14.6 33.7 22.9
-1.8 48.7 39.7

-32.1
-18.5

51.5 46.5
-9.7 10.5 10.5
0.0 47.2 38.4 -18.6
Source: 2000 and 2005 EDHS (Central Statistical Authority, 2001; ORC Macro, 2006)
Note: Stunted = height for age z-scores below –2; wasted = weight for height z scores below –2;
and underweight = weight for age z scores below –2 (World Health Organization, 1986).

Table 1 also shows that the prevalence of malnutrition in general is lower in 2005 than in
2000. The percentage declines over the period 2000–2005 show that the reductions in child
malnutrition (for stunting and underweight) is the highest for the highest level of maternal
education (which is “secondary and higher education”) and the lowest for the lowest level of
education (which is “no education”). However, there is no consistent decline for wasting. This
could be due to the fact that stock variables such as education and place of residence better explain
chronic outcomes such as stunting than acute fluctuations in nutritional status.
As expected, the urban advantage presented in Table 1 is unambiguous when the
performance of child nutritional status is disaggregated by place of residence without controlling
for other factors. In addition, the comparison between the 2000 and 2005 survey results shows that
the reductions in child stunting and underweight are larger in urban than in rural areas. However,
a number of studies find that any conclusion based on a simple bivariate relationship would be
misleading because the “advantage” often disappears when other important variables are included
(Fotso, 2006).
The kernel density plots in Figures 1 and 2 corroborate the results in Table 1. Figure 1
shows that the distributions can be differentiated by maternal education in national, rural, and
urban samples. In each panel, the dashed lines are to the right of the solid lines showing the
expected differences in height for weight z-scores (HAZ) and weight for height z-scores (WHZ)
of children by maternal education. The impact of maternal education is larger in HAZ and than
in WHZ (compare columns: Panels A1, B1, and C1 vs. Panels A2, B2, and C2). It is also larger in
rural than in urban areas (compare rows Panel B1 and B2 vs. Panels C1 and C2).
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Similarly, Figure 2 shows kernel density plots of HAZ and WHZ for national (all),
rural, and urban children by survey year. Each panel comprises two plots for each survey
year. The objective of the plots in each panel is to show if there were changes in the
distribution between the two surveys. Panels D1 and D2 are for the national sample, Panels
E1 and E2 are for the rural sample, and Panels F1 and F2 are for the urban sample. In all
the three cases, the densities in 2005 are to the right of that of the 2000, implying
improvements in child nutrition in 2005.
The statistical significance of the differences in child nutritional status by
background characteristics and time presented above (Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1) is
checked by executing a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of equality between the two
empirical distributions. In this test, the three null hypotheses are (1) H0: F some education(z)=
F no education,(z) z , (2) H0: F urban(z)= F rural(z ) z , and (3) H0: F2005(z)= F2000(z) z . The
KS test is based on the largest absolute gap between the cumulative distributions of F1 and
F0 where there are m observations for distribution 1 and n observations for distribution 0,
1n
1 m
i z
i z
i.e., F0 ( z )   10 yotherwise
and F1 ( z )   10 yotherwise
, where z is an indicator of child
n1
m1
nutritional status, including HAZ, WHZ, and WAZ. Then, the test statistic is obtained
from the supermom of the absolute values of the differences in the two empirical





cumulative distribution functions, i.e., D  max F0 ( z )  F1 ( z ) .
z
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Figure 1. Density Estimates of HAZ and WHZ by Maternal Education
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Figure 2 Density Estimates of Stunting and Wasting by Survey Year in 2000 and 2005
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Table 2 presents results of the KS test of equality of distributions for wasting2, stunting,
and underweight for national, rural, and urban samples. The p-values show that, in all three cases,
the null hypothesis that the two distributions are the same is rejected at less than 1% level of
significance. Therefore, consistent with the density plots in Figure 2, the test result indicates
significant improvement in child nutritional status.

Table 2. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Equality of Distributions of HAZ, WHZ, and WAZ
Test category

Maternal education:
Some education vs. No education

Place of residence: Urban vs. rural

Survey year: 2005 vs. 2000

Nutrition Sample
Indicator National

Rural

Urban

HAZ

0.150**

0.077**

0.154**

WHZ
WAZ
HAZ
WHZ
WAZ
HAZ
WHZ
WAZ

0.115**
0.182**
0.207**
0.125**
0.246**
0.074**
0.080**
0.080**

0.067**
0.093**
0.079**
0.084**
0.089**

0.132**
0.182**
0.090**
0.090**
0.123**

Note: The test compares cumulative distributions of each malnutrition indicator in 2000 and 2005; ** = pvalue < 0.01.

It is important to note that the reductions in stunting and underweight during the period
2000–2005 are not only statistically significant but also numerically substantial, carrying
important economic implications. In 2005 about 13 million (17%) of the total Ethiopian population
of 77.4 million were between ages 0 and 4. Therefore, the decline in stunting by 5 percentage
points, i.e., from 51.5% in 2000 to 46.5% in 2005, implies that there were 653,000 fewer stunted
children in 2005 than there would have been if the percent of stunting remained the same as in
2000. Similarly, the decline in underweight by 8.8 percentage points (from 47.2% in 2000 to 38.4%
in 2005) would mean that there were 1.15 million fewer underweight children than there would
have been if the percent of underweight remained the same as in 2000. Therefore, these
developments again motivate the questions: what are the relevant factors, and to what extent do
maternal education and its pathways explain child malnutrition in Ethiopia?

2

Although the test of equality of distribution shows that wasting has significantly declined in 2005, the improvement
in z-scores is to the right of the cutoff point, -2SD (Figure 2, Panel D2). Therefore, the proportion of wasted children
remains the same. However, the results in Table 2 imply that those children who were not wasted in the 2005 sample
had a better nutritional status than those in the 2000 sample
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4. Multivariate Analysis
The Empirical Framework
The standard procedure of identifying the determinants of child health outcomes involves
maximizing the household’s utility function subject to the biological or anthropometric production
function and other constraints (Pitt & Rosenzweig 1985; Thomas, Lavy, & Strauss, 1996; Webb
& Block, 2004). Equation (1) presents the household’s utility maximization problem, which is a
function of Hi (health status), Fi (food intake), Li (leisure), and Gi (consumption of other goods).
Health of household members and food intake enter directly and separately into the utility function
because health is good in itself and food is taken for reasons other than nutritional value. The
utility function may also be conditioned by observable individual characteristics (Xi), household
characteristics (Xh), community characteristics (Xc), and unobserved heterogeneity of preferences
(ψi).

max U  U(H i , Fi , L i , G i ; X i , X h , X c , ψ i )

H, F,L, G

U()  0, U()  0

(1)

The household maximizes the utility function subject to a budget constraint and a biological health
production function given by

H i  H(Fi , M i , X i , X h , X c , ηi ) ,

(2)

where Hi is nutritional status as measured in anthropometrics outcomes (e.g., height or weight),
Mi are non-food health inputs, ηi is unobserved individual health endowments, and all other
variables are as defined earlier. Then, the maximization problem leads to a reduced form demand
function for nutritional status:

H i  h(X i , X h , X c , ν i ) ,

(3)

where νi is unobserved nutritional outcome. Equation (3) provides a benchmark specification for
empirical analysis.3 Equation (3) basically specifies nutritional status as a function of individual,
household, and community characteristics. An important limitation of this approach is that it does
not allow inferring structural coefficients. However, the reduced form equation is still informative
about the effects on nutrition of changes in the explanatory variables thereof.
There are a wide range of variations in the specification of the empirical model of child
nutritional status in the literature. Variants of the empirical models derived from Equation (3) often
emanate from the choice of the dependent variable as well as the definition and measurement of
individual, household, and community characteristics. The availability of data also dictates the

3

Estimating structural equation involves endogenous factors such as child health inputs. However, due to difficulties
in finding instruments, most studies estimate a conditional demand function given by Equation (3) (e.g., Glewwe,
1999; Christiaensen and Alderman, 2004; Webb and Block, 2004; Frost, Forste, and Haas, 2005).

14
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empirical specification. Equation (3) can be rearranged to specify an empirical model that
distinguishes maternal education, pathway variables, and other control variables.
Incorporating Pathway Variables
Four key pathways are considered: (1) socioeconomic status, (2) health-seeking behavior,
(3) knowledge of health and family planning, and (4) reproductive behavior.
Socioeconomic status. Maternal education has a clear connection with the various key
elements of socioeconomic status, including high-income job, possession of assets, better health,
and sanitary conditions, to mention but a few. The empirical evidence demonstrates the existence
of a strong positive relationship 4 between socioeconomic status and child health outcomes.
Therefore, socioeconomic status stands out to be an important pathway channel between maternal
education and child health.
Health-seeking behavior. Education can also influence health care utilization and
reproductive health behavior. As Pongou, Ezzati, and Salomon (2006) note, in some traditional
societies, education would provide the mother with the capacity to break with some traditional
practices and taboos. Education promotes modern attitudes, and hence mothers with higher levels
of education are more likely to seek health care services from health centers and health
professionals. Educated mothers are also more likely to accept and use family planning methods,
including contraceptives.
Knowledge of family planning and health. Education enhances mother’s knowledge of
health, which is an important predictor of child health outcome (Glewwe, 1999; Webb and Block,
2004). Health knowledge can directly be acquired from formal education. Education can also
facilitate the mother’s ability to understand the causation and prevention methods of illness. It also
enhances her knowledge of nutrition and family planning. However, Frost, Forste, and Haas’
(2005) review indicates that the available empirical evidence on the relationship between maternal
health knowledge and child health is inconclusive.
Reproductive behavior. Reproductive behavior is another important link through which
education influences child health outcome. In general, educated women have more control over
their reproductive behavior and make conscious decisions––for example, on the number of births
and intervals. Reproductive behavior is proxied by mother’s age and selected child demographic
characteristics. Relevant child characteristics include age, sex, birth order, and preceding birth
interval.5
Vast evidence shows that the risk of child malnutrition increases with age in developing
countries. Webb and Block (2004, p. 812) find, though, that HAZ and WHZ decline with age with
4

Strong positive relationship with nutritional status means strong negative relationship with stunting and wasting.
It should be noted that, not all these demographic variables are responsive to maternal education. Therefore, some
such as sex and age of child are included as additional control variables.
5
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a positive second derivative. An explanation for this relationship is the nutritional value of
breastfeeding that protects young children from the risk of stunting or wasting at early age
(Pongou, Ezzati, & Salomon, 2006) and, potentially, shortage of supplemental food in later
months. In addition, some measures of malnutrition, such as stunting, are results of cumulative
process of inadequate dietary intake and illness. Therefore, younger children are at lower risk
(Webb & Block, 2004).
The rationale for including gender in the model of child nutrition is to capture the presence
of male-bias in intra-household allocation of resources (Behrman, 1997).6 However, the empirical
evidence supporting this hypothesis remains scarce. Based on a review of 306 child nutrition
surveys conducted since 1985 in a number of developing countries, Marcoux (2002) finds no sex
differences in 227 surveys. In fact, the evidence from Africa and some other developing countries
in Asia and Latin America shows that, when significant differences exist, boys are more likely to
be malnourished than girls.
Birth order measures parity while birth interval captures the care and support that have
been made available to the child. The empirical evidence on parity is mixed. For example, in
India, Jeyaseelan and Lakshman (1997) find that malnutrition is higher among children of higher
birth order (5+). On the other hand, in Ethiopia, Girma and Genebo (2002) find that the risk of
stunting is higher among first births. However, it is common to find that the risk of malnutrition
declines with birth interval (Pongou, Ezzati, & Salomon, 2006).
Finally, place of residence and geographic regions are included as control variables in most
specifications. It should be noted however that these controls are also influenced by maternal
education. Education increases mobility and creates more opportunities in urban than rural areas.
Desai and Alva (1998) find that in addition to socioeconomic factors, geographical controls are
important links through which the impact of maternal education on child health outcome is
mediated.
Data and Measurement of Variables
The data. This study uses two waves of the Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey
(EDHS) available at the time of writing (Central Statistical Agency, 2001; ORC Macro, 2006).
The first survey was completed in 2000 and the second survey in 2005. The EDHS sample is
stratified, clustered, and collected with a two-stage probabilistic sampling technique based on the
list of enumeration areas of the 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia. Therefore, the
description and analysis undertaken in this study take into account the nature of the data.
6

Another form of gender biased human capital outcome would result from fertility behavior. Jensen (2002) argues
that female children may have more siblings than male children as a result of son-preferring differential-stopping
behavior in fertility, i.e., on average, females come from a larger family size where all children are worse off.
Therefore, even if there is equal treatment at the household level, there may be unequal outcome at aggregate level.
In some traditional societies, son-preferring behavior would result in inequalities in nutritional outcomes (Tarozzi and
Mahajan, 2007).
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Accordingly, the sample weight, sample strata, and primary sampling units are included. At the
first sampling stage in the 2000 survey, 539 (138 urban and 401 rural) clusters were selected. In
the 2005 survey, 540 (145 urban and 395 rural) clusters were selected. The second stage consisted
of the selection of a representative sample of households and women aged 15–49 years old in each
household. Accordingly, in the 2000 survey, 15,367 women from 14,072 households were
selected. In the 2005 survey, 14,070 women from 14,500 households were selected. In both
surveys, women were asked questions about their children, especially for those younger than 5,
and anthropometric measurements (height and weight) were taken. In the 2000 and 2005 surveys,
the total number of children measured and whose mothers were also interviewed were 9,774 and
4,296, respectively.
Measurement of variables
Dependent Variable: Child Nutritional Status. Long-term or chronic malnutrition is
measured by height for age (HAZ), while short-term or acute malnutrition is measured by weight
for height (WHZ). A child is deemed stunted if HAZ score is less than –2SD and wasted if WHZ
score is less than –2SD. Therefore, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes 1
if the child is stunted or wasted, and 0 otherwise.
Explanatory Variables. The primary variables of interest are maternal education and
pathway variables. The models are also controlled for geography (place of residence and regions)
and survey year. The variables are measured as follows.
The DHS data compile maternal education in two different forms: single years and highest
level of education. For ease of interpretation, six categories are considered following the DHS
classification. These are: (1) no education, (2) incomplete primary education, (3) complete primary
education, (4) incomplete secondary education, (5) complete secondary education, and (6) higher
education. The corresponding values from the smallest to the highest education category range
from 0–-5.
Socioeconomic status is measured differently in different studies. Frost, Forste, and Haas
(2005) construct two index variables from selected household assets and dwelling characteristics.
However, for this study the DHS wealth index is used because in addition to a number of household
assets and dwelling characteristics, it considers the household’s demographic structure. 7 Assets
and amenities included in the DHS wealth index range from the possession of items (e.g., bicycles,
cars, radios, sofas, and televisions); dwelling characteristics, such as type of flooring material or
the level of overcrowding; household facilities such as source of drinking water, type of toilet
facility, and type of cooking fuel; and other characteristics related to wealth status.
7

The pros and cons of the DHS wealth index have been noted. On the one hand, the DHS surveys are often
implemented in countries where income itself may not be the most reliable—or even available—way of measuring
socioeconomic status. On the other hand, the index is constructed from urban-based social and economic amenities
and may be measuring urbanicity instead of socioeconomic status.
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Mother’s health-seeking behavior is an index variable constructed from utilization of
selected preventive health care services. It is constructed by principal component analysis from
four related variables included in the EDHS (Table 3). These are: (1) received prenatal services
from a health professional or a trained birth attendant; (2) delivered a baby at a health center
(hospital, clinic, others); (3) have used contraceptive; and (4) received tetanus injection before
birth.
Similarly, maternal knowledge of family planning and health is an index variable
constructed by principal component analysis from selected variables available in the 2000 and
2005 EDHS. Health knowledge is measured by knowledge of oral rehydration therapy, i.e., if the
woman heard of or used oral rehydration therapy. Family planning knowledge is measured by
knowledge of ovulation cycle, i.e., if the woman knows when during her ovulation cycle she can
get pregnant. Additional factors included in the knowledge index are proxies of family planning
information from radio, TV, newspaper, and frequencies of reading newspaper, listening to radio,
and watching TV (Table 3).
Reproductive behavior is proxied by maternal age and selected child characteristics such
as age, sex of child, birth order, and birth interval. Child age is in months and maternal age is in
years. Both are in logs. The remaining––namely, sex of child, birth order, and preceding birth
intervals—are dummy variables.

Table 3. Factor Analyses of Health-Seeking Behavior and Knowledge Indices
Sample
Variable
Mean
Health-Seeking Behavior Index
Delivered a baby in modern health facility 0.051
Received prenatal from a health professional 0.276
Received tetanus injection before birth
0.313
Used contraceptive
0.186
Knowledge Index
Has heard of oral rehydration therapy
0.570
Knows when in ovulation cycle can get
pregnant
0.408
Frequency of reading newspaper
0.062
Frequency of listening to radio
0.457
Frequency of watching TV
0.099
Heard of family planning from radio
0.176
Heard of family planning from TV
0.026
Read about family planning from newspaper 0.019

Factor
Loadings

α

0.491
0.546
0.490
0.470

0.718

0.185
0.135
0.377
0.381
0.439
0.378
0.429
0.376

0.716

Source: EDHS 2000 and 2005 (Central Statistical Authority and ORC Macro, 2001, 2006)
Note: α is a reliability coefficient or Cronbach’s alpha. It is greater than 0.7 in both cases, which is
within acceptable range.
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Finally, Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the model’s variables included in the regressions,
excluding control dummy variables for place of residence and geographic regions.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables
Variables

2000 EDHS
Min
Max
Height for age (HAZ) z-score
-5.99 5.84
Weight for height (WHZ) z-score -3.99 5.71
Stunted (HAZ<-2SD=1) (b)
0
1
Wasted (WHZ<-2SD=1) (b)
0
1
Maternal education
0
5
Wealth index
-1.05 3.43
Health index
-1.16 4.85
Knowledge index
-1.20 9.94
Child: Gender (Male=1) (b)
0
1
Child: age (months & in logs)
0.00 4.09
Child: age squared
0.00 16.76
Child: Birth order >3 (b)
0
1
Child: Birth interval > 2years (b) 0
1
Mother: age (years & in logs)
2.71 3.89
Mother: age squared
7.33 15.14

Mean
-2.06
-0.78
0.51
0.11
0.30
-0.41
-0.29
-0.23
0.51
3.14
10.62
0.51
0.65
3.36
11.33

SD
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.03

2005 EDHS
Min Max
-5.98 5.78
-3.99 5.91
0
1
0
1
0
5
-3.10 3.76
-1.16 3.68
-1.20 9.94
0
1
0.00 4.09
0.00 16.76
0
1
0
1
2.71 3.89
7.33 15.15

Mean
-1.77
-0.58
0.46
0.11
0.32
-0.36
-0.09
-0.18
0.51
3.10
10.45
0.53
0.65
3.35
11.27

SD
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.03

Source: 2000 and 2005 EDHS (Central Statistical Authority and ORC Macro, 2001, 2006).
Note: (b )= binary indicators; Min = minimum value; Max = maximum value; and SD = standard deviations.

5. Results and Discussion
The multivariate analysis results are based on the estimation of the various specifications
of Equation (3). As indicated earlier, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable. Therefore,
the models are estimated using logistic regression. The logistic regression model fits the log odds
or logits by a linear function of the explanatory variables as follows: logit(p i )  ln[ 1pi i ]    x' β ,
p

where pi is the probability that the child is stunted or wasted conditional on x , which is a vector of
p

explanatory variables included in Equation (3); ln[ 1 pi i ] is the log odds of the outcome; and α and
β are the parameters to be estimated.
Maternal Education and Chronic Malnutrition
Table 5 reports the log odds of various specifications of chronic malnutrition, stunting.
Model 1 is the baseline model with only maternal education included as a primary explanatory
variable after controlling for survey year.8 Model 2 adds geographic controls (place of residence
and regions) to Model 1. Models 3–6 each add a pathway variable to the baseline model after
8

The pooled (2000 and 2005) data are used in all models. Therefore, all are controlled for by a survey year dummy.
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controlling for place of residence, regions, and survey year. In this row, Model 3 is the
socioeconomic status model; Model 4 is the health-seeking behavior model; Model 5 is the
knowledge model; and Model 6 is the reproductive behavior model. Finally, Model 7 presents
the full model with all the primary explanatory variables and control variables included.
Maternal education is significant in the baseline model (Model 1), where it is controlled
only for survey year. Model 2 shows that the addition of geographic controls to the baseline model
reduces the education effect while the significance of the education variable remains unchanged.
Models 3–6 show that, except for the health-seeking behavior, all other pathways (socioeconomic
status, knowledge, and reproductive behavior) are significant, and the education effect is
significant but lower in absolute value when compared to the baseline model. However, in the full
model (Model 7), maternal education, socioeconomic status and some reproductive behavior
variables are significant. The decline in the significance of some of the pathway variables could
be due to multicollinearity either with maternal education or socioeconomic status or both.
The top row of Table 5 shows that the log odds associated with maternal education decline
from 0.27 to 0.16 in absolute value. It appears that each level of education decreases the relative
probability of stunting by 24% ( = [1-exp (log odds)]*100) in the baseline model.9 The impact
declines to 15% in the full model (see also Table 7). Therefore, the decline in the direct effect of
education from 24% to 15% means that the pathways and geographic controls explained only about
38% of the education effect.
Referring to the full model (Table 5, Model 7), the important predictors of stunting are,
therefore, maternal education, socioeconomic status, and reproductive behavior. Socioeconomic
status is the most important predictor of stunting as demonstrated by the magnitude of the
coefficient (log odds) and its significance. The likelihood of stunting also increases with child age
at a decreasing rate and increases with maternal age at a decreasing rate. Similar to earlier findings
in Africa and other developing countries (e.g., Marcoux, 2002), but in contrast to other studies on
Ethiopia (e.g., Girma and Genebo, 2002), the male dummy is significant, implying that male
children are more likely to be stunted than females.

9

For a unit increase in the jth regressor, the derivation and interpretation is as follows: exp(x' β) increases to

exp( x' β  β j )  exp( x' β) * exp(β j ) . Hence the odds ratio [ 1 pi i ] increases by a multiple exp(β j ) . Thus, for
p

example, the logit slope parameter of 0.1 means a unit increase in the regressor multiplies the initial odds ratio by
exp(0.1) = 1.105, which is a proportionate increase of 0.105 times the initial odds ratio. Therefore, the relative
probability of being stunted increases or decreases (depending on the sign of the coefficient in the logit model) by
10.5 percent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 470).
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Table 5. Logistic Estimates of Child Stunting (pooled sample)
Variable
Maternal education
Socioeconomic status
Health-seeking behavior
Knowledge
Reproductive behavior
Child: gender (Male=1)
Child: age (ln)
Child: age squared
Child: birth order > 3
Child: birth interval > 2
years
Mother: age (ln)
Mother: age squared
Residence: (Urban=1)
Survey year: (2005=1)

Constant
Regional variation? a
Pseudo R square
Log Likelihood
LRChi2
# of observations

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7

-0.27** -0.23** -0.19** -0.23** -0.17** -0.23** -0.16**
(-7.41) (-5.46) (-4.31) (-4.70) (-3.56) (-5.44) (-2.65)
-0.28**
-0.37**
(2.96)
(-3.40)
-0.04
-0.05
(-1.38)
(-1.60)
-0.08**
-0.04
(-2.07)
(-0.80)
0.09 0.17**
(1.94) (2.89)
3.86** 3.85**
(11.18) (9.51)
-0.52** -0.50**
(-9.34) (-7.40)
0.28**
0.12
(3.58) (1.23)
-0.08 -0.11
(-1.34) (-1.38)
7.76** 6.87*
(2.63) (2.09)
-1.21** -1.07**
(-2.78) (-2.21)
-0.06
0.25 -0.01
0.04 -0.09
0.34
(-0.35) (1.15) (-0.05) (0.18) -(0.49) (1.33)
-0.19** -0.18** -0.16** -0.11 -0.17** -0.22 -0.08
(-3.06) (-2.97) (-2.62) (-1.49) -(2.84) (-3.36) (-1.12)
0.13 -0.54** -0.43* -0.53** -0.53** -19.77** -18.20**
(3.38) (-2.70) (-2.24) (-2.67) (-2.78) (-3.94) (-3.29)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Nob
0.01
0.02
0.10
0.02
0.02
0.10
0.13
-9,704 -9,632 -9,620 -6,484 -9,556 -8,844 -5,681
186** 331** 355** 245** 343** 1,909** 1,764**
12,463 12,463 12,463 8,572 12,350 12,463 8,498

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively; a regional variation
refers to the 11 geographic regions with Addis Ababa as a reference category; b no variation for most regions except
for Dire, Dawa, and Gambella regions, where they are found better than the reference category.

The place of residence dummy (urban = 1) is insignificant in all models. The result is
expected in multivariate setting due to the fact that the “urban advantage” is captured by other
better measures of urban-based social and economic amenities (Fotso, 2006). However, some
regions (Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromyia, Somali, and SNNP) are found significantly different
from the reference region, Addis Ababa (Model 2). A child from one of these regions is more
likely to be stunted when compared to a child from the reference region, Addis Ababa. The
regional variation obtained in Models 2–6 could be due to differences in the level of urbanization.
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Finally, the discussion in Section 3 suggested significant changes in stunting occurred over
time. However, the results of the full model in Table 5 show that the survey year dummy is
insignificant, suggesting the absence of difference between 2000 and 2005 when other factors are
considered. Thus, the observed change in stunting over time is attributable to changes in other
factors including maternal education, socioeconomic status and reproductive behavior.
Table 6. Logistic Estimates of Child Wasting (pooled sample)
Variable
Maternal education

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
-0.23** -0.11 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.081
(-4.05) -(1.88) (-0.87) (-1.48) (-1.21) (-1.90) (-0.98)
Socioeconomic status
-0.42**
-0.41**
(-3.10)
(-2.63)
Health-seeking behavior
-0.06
-0.04
(-1.26)
(-0.79)
Knowledge
-0.04
0.03
(-0.77)
(0.58)
Reproductive behavior
0.14
0.20*
Child: gender (Male=1)
(1.81) (2.35)
Child: age (ln)
3.13** 3.44**
(6.11) (5.21)
Child: age squared
-0.59** -0.64**
(-6.64) (-5.39)
Child: birth order >3
0.12
-0.03
(1.11) (-0.25)
Child: birth interval >2
0.14
0.23*
(1.55) (2.08)
Mother: age (ln)
7.84
7.84
(1.57) (1.54)
Mother: age squared
-1.07 -1.15
(-1.56) (-1.54)
Residence: (Urban=1)
-0.56** -0.11 -0.45* -0.52* -0.54** -0.01
(-2.83) (-.45)
(-2.07) (-2.43) (-2.63) (-0.04)
Survey year: (2005=1)
-0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05
-(0.16) (-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.51)
Regional variation? a
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N0
Pseudo R square
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.04
Log likelihood
-4,820 -4,790 -4,780 -3,518 -4,756 -4,669 -3,399
LRChi2
33.3** 94.6** 113.7** 75.4** 94.9** 342** 284**
# of observations
12,637 12,637 12,637 9,601 8,660 12,637 8,585
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively; a regional
variation refers to the 11 geographic regions with Addis Ababa as a reference category; b no variation for
all regions except for Somali Region where the likelihood of child wasting is found larger than the
reference category.

Maternal Education and Acute Malnutrition
Table 6 reports logistic regression results of acute malnutrition, wasting. The presentation
in Table 6 follows the same approach used earlier in Table 5. Therefore, the first row in Table 6
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demonstrates how the effect of education on wasting changes as a new pathway variable is added
to the baseline model.
The comparison of results in Table 5 and Table 6 would show the differences and common
features of models of chronic and acute malnutrition. First, in Table 6, maternal education is
insignificant in all except the baseline model. Second, both education and the two pathway
variables of health-seeking behavior and knowledge are also insignificant as shown in models 4
and 5. However, similar to the chronic malnutrition case, socioeconomic status and selected
reproductive behavior variables are significantly related to acute malnutrition. In addition,
geographic and survey year controls are found to have a similar pattern.
Robustness Tests: Alternative Sample Domains
Tables 7 and 8 report logistic regression results of the full models of stunting and wasting,
respectively, based on alternative sample domains. The estimations are based on a disaggregated data by
survey year and place of residence. Each table incorporates four models. The first two models are for each
survey year: 2000 and 2005. The third and the fourth models are for rural and urban children, respectively.

Table 7. Logistic Estimates of Child Stunting by Survey Year and Place of Residence
2000
Maternal education
-0.14
Socioeconomic status
-0.37
Health-seeking behavior -0.05
Knowledge
-0.05
Reproductive behavior
Child: gender (Male=1) 0.16
Child: age (ln)
3.70
Child: age squared
-0.47
Child: birth order >3
0.08
Child: birth interval >2 -0.17
Mother: age (ln)
10.35
Mother: age squared
-1.56
Residence: (Urban=1)
0.36
Survey year: (2005=1)
Constant
-23.97
Regional Variation?
Pseudo R square
Log Likelihood
LRChi2
# of Observations

2005
Rural
Urban
(-1.76) -0.18 (-2.04)* -0.21 (-2.73)** -0.07 (-0.63)
(-2.74)** -0.48 (-2.33)* -0.36 (-2.60)** -0.61 (-2.71)**
(-1.35)
(-0.80)

-0.06 (-0.98)
-0.01 (-0.20)

-0.03 (-0.73)
-0.05 (-0.95)

-0.13 (-1.98) *
0.00 (-0.02)

(2.42) *
(7.46) **
(-5.71)**
(0.63)
(-1.68)
(2.61) **
(-2.69)**
(1.04)
-(-3.58)**
No
0.14
-4,014
1,254
5,971

0.19 (1.80)
4.27 (6.84) **
-0.58 (-5.42)**
0.26 (1.59)
0.02 (0.17)
-2.93 (-0.52)
0.34 (0.41)
0.26 (1.02)
-1.94 (-0.21)
No
0.14
-1,654
527
2,527

0.23 (3.75)**
4.03 (9.94)**
-0.53 (-7.68)**
0.16 (1.66)
-0.09 (-1.11)
5.89 (1.76)
-0.93 (-1.89)
-0.07 (-0.84)
-16.63 (-2.95)**
Yes
0.14
-5,079
1,586
6,600

-0.38 (-1.92)
1.91 (1.55)
-0.19 (-0.93)
-0.08 (-0.19)
-0.23 (-1.08)
16.49 (1.27)
-2.43 (-1.26)
-0.37 (-1.67)
-31.07 (-1.48)**
Yes
0.15
-550
194
1,450

Note: t-stat in parenthesis; * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively; pooled data is used for
rural and urban models; urban regions (Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Harari) are excluded in the rural model and the
reference category in the rural model is Tigray; the reference category for regional dummies in all other models is
Addis Ababa.
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The results in Table 7 are generally similar to the results in Table 5. Accordingly,
socioeconomic status is significant in all cases. Education retains its significance in two of the four
cases. Health-seeking behavior and knowledge are insignificant in most cases. However, healthseeking behavior appears significant in the urban model. Likewise, the results in Table 8 are similar
to those of Table 6. In most cases maternal education and its pathways are insignificant.

Table 8. Logistic Estimates of Child Wasting by Survey Year and Residence
2000
Maternal education
0.03 (0.36)
Socioeconomic status -0.34 (-1.82)
Health-seeking
-0.01 (-0.21)
Knowledge
-0.04 (-0.62)
Reproductive behavior
Child:
gender
(Male=1)
0.18 (1.72)
Child: age (ln)
4.46 (6.06)**
Child: age squared -0.81 (-6.21)**
Child: birth order >3 0.03 (0.21)
Child: birth interval
>2
0.45 (3.48)**
Mother: age (ln)
2.37 (0.39)
Mother: age squared -0.35 (-0.39)
Residence (Urban=1) -0.12 (-0.36)
Survey year (2005=1)
Constant
-12.14 (-1.17)
Regional variation?
No
Pseudo R square
0.05
Log likelihood
-2,405
# of observations
6,058

2005
-0.35
-0.63
-0.08
0.15

(-2.33)*
(-1.88)
(-0.93)
(1.54)

Rural
-0.15
-0.41
-0.03
0.03

(-1.48)
(-2.05)*
(-0.61)
(0.40)

Urban
0.09
-0.35
-0.09
-0.01

(0.51)
(-1.31)
(-0.90)
(-0.11)

0.26
1.75
-0.34
-0.07

(1.71)
(1.62)
(-1.74)
(-0.29)

0.19
3.40
-0.63
-0.07

(2.06)*
(4.93)**
(-5.10)**
(-0.51)

0.45
4.40
-0.78
0.26

(1.31)
(2.05)*
(-2.04)*
(0.56)

(2.08)*
(1.82)
(-1.81)

0.21 (0.51)
-11.16 (-0.52)
1.55 (0.48)

-0.33
21.11
-3.09
0.20

(-1.66) 0.24
(2.27)* 9.63
(-2.26)* -1.40
(0.35)
-0.04
-40.40 (-2.58)** -22.97
No
0.06
-947
2,527

(-0.37) -0.15
(-2.57)** 11.37
Yes
0.04
-3,149
6,682

(-0.28)
(0.33)
Yes
0.10
-224
1,454

Note: t-stat in parenthesis; * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively; pooled data is used for
rural and urban models; urban regions (Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Harari) are excluded in the rural model and
the reference category in the rural model is Tigray; the reference category for regional dummies in all other models
is Addis Ababa.

6. Discussion
Table 9 summarizes the results and compares the effect of maternal education on child
nutritional status by model type and measure of malnutrition. The log odds effects of education in
Table 9 are obtained from the first rows in the previous tables (Tables 5–8). The impact of each
level of education on the relative probability of being stunted or wasted is calculated accordingly,
i.e., (1-exp(log odds)).
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Table 9. The Effect of Maternal Education and Pathway Variables on Stunting and Wasting by Model Type

Chronic Malnutrition (Stunting)
Acute Malnutrition (Wasting)
1-exp Education Pathway
1-exp
Pathway
log (log significant variable
log (log Education variable
odds odds) ?
significant? odds odds) significant? significant?
-0.27 0.24 Yes
_
-0.23 0.20 Yes
_
-0.23 0.21 Yes
Yes
-0.11 0.10 No
Yes
-0.19 0.17 Yes
Yes
-0.06 0.05 No
Yes
-0.23 0.21 Yes
No
-0.10 0.10 No
No
-0.17 0.16 Yes
Yes
-0.08 0.08 No
No
-0.23 0.21 Yes
Yes
-0.12 0.11 No
Yes

Model Type
Baseline
Geographic
SES
Health-seeking
Knowledge
Reproductive
Full model
National
-0.16
Rural sample -0.21
Urban sample -0.07
2000 sample -0.14
2005 sample -0.18

0.15
0.19
0.07
0.13
0.16

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yesa
Yesa
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.12
-0.15
-0.09
0.03
-0.35

0.11 No
0.14 No
0.09 No
-0.03 No
0.30 Yes

Yesa
Yesa
No
No
No

Note: SES is socioeconomic status; a some pathways only (mostly SES).

Table 9 indicates that the maximum effect of maternal education on stunting and wasting
is observed in the baseline model. It is 24% for stunting and 20% for wasting. In the full model,
the effect declines to 15% for stunting and 11% for wasting. The table also shows that maternal
education and its pathways are more relevant in explaining stunting than wasting. Except for the
baseline model, maternal education is not significant in all other models of wasting. Another
important observation is that the direct effect of maternal education is larger in the rural than urban
areas. Each level of maternal education in the rural sample reduces the relative probability of
stunting by 19%. However, it is not significant in the urban areas.
Socioeconomic status is the most important factor of all pathways in mediating the impact
of maternal education on child nutritional status. It is significant in all sample categories of
stunting and in the national and rural models of wasting. 10 The results imply that policies and
programs intended to reduce child malnutrition and hence child mortality would primarily focus
on targeting the various key elements of socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status in this study
is measured by the DHS wealth index. Unfortunately, its specific misgivings would make it less
amenable to policy. First, the key elements from which the DHS wealth index is constructed are
predominantly urban based. Therefore, the index could simply be measuring urbanicity. Second,
different elements contribute to the index differently. Therefore, the individual part of the index
that essentially is driving the impact on child health needs further study.
Overall, the results obtained for chronic and acute child malnutrition are in line with earlier
related studies on other countries, including Frost, Forste, and Haas (2005) for Bolivia, and Webb
10

The minimum level of statistical significance employed in this study is 5%. However, socioeconomic status is
significant at the 10% level in the 2000 and 2005 samples. All other pathways are very far from that value (Table 7).
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and Block (2004) for Indonesia. The findings are also robust to changes to sample domains.
Disaggregating the sample by survey year and place of residence did not change the results
substantially. However, the inability to explain the full effects of maternal education in chronic
malnutrition and its erratic relationships with acute malnutrition is a noted limitation to the analysis
presented in this study. The problem could be due to the importance of other channels that are not
considered in this study or measurement error in the variables from which the indices of the
pathways are constructed. Future work on the issue using a different data set and a different country
would add more insight in the relationship between maternal education and child nutritional status.
Summary and Conclusions
This study models the impact of maternal education and its pathways on chronic and acute
child malnutrition in Ethiopia using the 2000 and 2005 Demographic and Health Surveys. The
pathways examined in this study are socioeconomic status, maternal health-seeking behavior,
maternal knowledge of health and family planning, and reproductive behavior. The logistic
models of stunting and wasting are estimated for various sample categories, including the national,
rural, and urban samples, and the 2000 and 2005 samples.
The results indicated that maternal education works through all pathways except healthseeking behavior. Each level of maternal education reduces the relative probability of being
chronically malnourished by 15%. However, after incorporating pathway variables, no direct
effect of maternal education is obtained on acute malnutrition. Overall, maternal education and its
pathway explain chronic malnutrition better than acute malnutrition. The claim that maternal
education is the single most important predictor of malnutrition appears to be an
oversimplification.
Socioeconomic status is the most important pathway linking maternal education and child
nutritional status. It is significant in both models of chronic and acute malnutrition. Although
girls’ education is a high policy priority, our finding suggests that it may take time before its direct
and indirect impacts to materialize and substantially improve child health outcomes. Faster results
would require direct interventions on key elements of socioeconomic status.
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COMESA’S Trading with China: Patterns and Prospects
Matias Assefa, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Abstract: As trade between China and African countries continues to expand, so
does the debate as regards the developmental outcomes it is likely to produce. This
paper examines the trade relations that have developed between the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and China since 2000. The
bilateral trade—composed largely of exports of primary goods and imports of
manufactures by the COMESA region—has registered very high rates of growth.
The trade balance has been for the most part in China’s favor. The paper uses a
gravity model of bilateral trade estimated by the Hausman-Taylor method for a
reference sample of countries to project the COMESA-China trade “out of sample.”
Empirical estimates suggest a substantial degree of underutilization of the bilateral
export and import potentials. The main implication is that there are still strong
resistances to the bilateral trade that need to be addressed.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that international trade plays an important role in the process of
economic development. Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) in 2000 in Beijing, the value of goods and services moving between China and the
African continent has witnessed exponential growth. From its initially negligible position, China
has become Africa’s major trade partner. China has also signed bilateral trade agreements with
several African countries (China, 2010), and it has declared that “when conditions are ripe,” it is
willing to negotiate free trade agreement with African countries and African regional organizations
(China, 2006).
Economists have debated about the opportunities and challenges of the Sino-African trade
(e.g., World Bank, 2004; Jenkins & Edwards 2005; Broadman, 2007; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2008).
Much of the existing literature assumes that China and Africa have high unexploited trade
opportunities between them (e.g., Jenkins and Edwards, 2005; Zafar, 2007; Subramanian &
Matthijs 2007). But what is often missing is rigorous analysis. Few studies have tried to predict
the China-Africa trade based on econometric analysis—much less focusing on specific regional
trade blocs in Africa. The existing discourse often takes “Africa” as a whole, which has its own
limitations (Taylor, 2009). While there is scant empirical literature on China’s trade integration
with particular regional economic communities in Africa, it has been recognized that African
regional organizations play an important role in “China’s response to the demands and challenges
it is faced with as an emerging economic and political power in Africa” (Van Hoeymissen, 2011).
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the trade link and potential between China
and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).11 China is now the
world’s second largest economy (after the United States) with about one-fifth of the world
population. COMESA is one of the largest and most vibrant regional economic
communities in Africa (Alemayehu & Haile, 2008). The regional bloc attained a Free Trade
Area (FTA) in 2000, and it is now moving toward a Customs Union (COMESA, 2013).
With a combined population of 460 million, a combined GDP of US$540 billion and rich
endowment of natural resources, COMESA can play a major role in conditioning China’s
trade integration with Africa with significant developmental consequence.12 Indeed, China
appointed representatives to COMESA (Van Hoeymissen, 2011), while COMESA as a
regional bloc has been seeking to establish trade agreements with China. The COMESA
Secretariat said in a statement: “COMESA has named China as a new lucrative destination
for its expansion programs in enhancing trade and attracting investment.”13
In this paper, merchandise trade between COMESA and China is analyzed and the
bilateral trade potential is econometrically estimated using a dataset for the period 2000–
2011. Estimation of the trade potential is based on McPherson and Trumbull (2008), where
a gravity model of bilateral trade will be estimated by a Hausman and Taylor (1981) method
for “out-of-sample” trade projection. The paper finds strong evidence for future COMESAChina trade prospects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief analysis of
trade patterns between COMESA and China in the recent past. Section III discusses the
literature on gravity models of bilateral trade and their econometric estimation. Section IV
empirically investigates the trade potential between COMESA countries and China.
Section V concludes.
The Patterns of COMESA-China Trade
Trade between COMESA and China has accelerated in recent years. This is perhaps due to
trade reforms in both regions (Zafar, 2007). Between 2000 and 2011, merchandise exports from
COMESA to China increased from close to US$894 million to US$16 billion, averaging an annual
growth rate of more than 480% (Table 1). If one excluded the extremely outlying growth rates for
Burundi, Seychelles and Swaziland, COMESA exports to China would still grow on average by
more than 145% per annum. Meanwhile, Table 2 shows that COMESA imported US$1.5 billion

11

COMESA is a membership of 19 countries: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. It was established by a Treaty signed in November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda and ratified in
December 1994 in Lilongwe, Malawi. It was formed to replace the former Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and
Southern Africa (PTA) which had existed since 1981(see http://www.comesa.int).
12
Of the total value of Chinese-African merchandise trade in 2012, COMESA accounted for over 27%.
13
“COMESA Seeks Partnership with China.” 2005. People’s Daily Online, April 28.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/28/eng20050428_182973.html (accessed November 27, 2012).
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in merchandise from China in 2000. The import figure rose to US$17.2 billion in 2011, at a rate
of 39.7% per annum.
Table 1. COMESA’s Merchandise Exports to China, 2000–2011
Values
(US$ Thousand)

Burundi
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Djibouti
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia

Average Growth Rates
(%)

2000

2005

2011

2000–11

742

123

2,812

1930.1

4

0.4

1

91.0

664

276,222

3,016,477

172.3

10

195

142

319.6

39,148

109,272

968,517

76.9

38

251

936

362.9

935

90,444

283,443

120.0

Kenya

3,424

17,040

61,564

31.8

Libya

23,472

810,676

1,816,524

406.3

5,918

21,131

91,049

34.0

Madagascar
Malawi

132

2,368

55,056

413.3

Mauritius

1,156

6,323

6,397

51.4

Rwanda

1,488

12,317

56,390

53.8

88

7

421

1107.9

Seychelles
Sudan

673,688

2,680,168

6,012,749

28.3

Swaziland

148

24,945

839

3784.8

Uganda

661

15,959

41,207

76.1

Zambia
Zimbabwe

41,425
100,716

117,095
131,313

2,926,234
562,891

63.8
29.2

All COMESA

893,858

4,315,850

15,903,648

481.8

Source: UNCTAD (2013).
Note. The average growth rate for Comoros’ exports to China does not include the period 2002–2005 due to
missing data.

COMESA and China have become increasingly important in each other’s trade profiles,
but not to the same degree (Table 4). While there has been a marked shift in COMESA’s trade
toward China and China has become COMESA’s second largest trade partner—only behind the
European Union (EU), trade with COMESA still comprises a very small proportion of China’s
total trade. The share of China in COMESA’s total exports has more than quintupled, from 3.1%
to 16.1% during 2000–2011, while the share of COMESA in China’s overall exports only rose
from 0.6% to 0.9%. In the same period, the share of China in COMESA’s total imports grew from
4.1% to 10.6%, whereas the share of COMESA in China’s world imports increased from 0.5% to
1.2%.
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Table 2. COMESA’s Merchandise Imports from China, 2000–11
Values
(US$ Thousand)

Average Growth Rates
(%)

2000

2005

2011

2000–11

5,663

12,150

63,472

33.0

249

1,651

13,232

53.7

Congo, Dem. Rep.

19,598

82,631

882,496

45.8

Djibouti

24,896

24,964

97,908

18.1

640,388

914,544

6,320,561

29.8

3,365

13,684

246,081

92.6

Burundi
Comoros

Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia

96,673

516,952

1,718,111

34.3

Kenya

113,894

413,371

1,859,098

30.7

Libya

52,399

251,301

768,991

31.1

Madagascar

88,667

234,454

540,631

44.6

Malawi

8,664

28,762

206,374

37.3

157,558

310,247

625,899

14.6

Rwanda

4,245

15,673

108,528

45.0

Seychelles

3,778

6,890

12,428

16.3

154,956

1,447,890

1,994,640

32.6

3,231

35,511

178,303

73.5

Uganda

39,782

108,800

513,555

33.7

Zambia
Zimbabwe

19,049
35,370

83,131
112,408

703,038
383,034

51.0
36.0

1,472,425

4,615,014

17,236,381

39.7

Mauritius

Sudan
Swaziland

All COMESA

Source: UNCTAD (2013).
Note. The figures on Sudan’s imports from China in 2010–2011 are based on China’s export data.

The significance of trade with China (in terms of value) also varies widely between
individual COMESA member states (Table 5). On the export side, China’s share in the value of
total merchandise exports reaches as high as 56% in Sudan, 46% in Democratic Republic of the
Congo and 33% in Zambia, whereas the corresponding share is less than 1% in Comoros, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland. But the Chinese share in total exports has increased
in almost all COMESA countries over the 2000–2011 period, with Comoros, Djibouti and Eritrea
being the only exceptions. On the import side, China makes up between 15–30% of the value of
total merchandise imports in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Madagascar and Sudan; the corresponding share is found to be less than 5% in Comoros and
Seychelles.
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Table 3. Country Distribution of COMESA’s Trade with China (%)
COMESA Exports
to China
Burundi
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Djibouti
Egypt

COMESA Imports
from China

0.01

0.3

0.00001

0.1

15.1

3.8

0.001

0.6

5.7

34.7

0.005

0.8

Ethiopia

1.8

13.5

Kenya

0.3

10.7

Libya

Eritrea

18.5

6.2

Madagascar

0.5

3.3

Malawi

0.2

1.1

0.05

3.9

Mauritius
Rwanda
Seychelles
Sudan
Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

0.2

0.6

0.001

0.1

41.6

12.3

0.1

0.5

0.3

3.0

13.2
2.4

2.6
1.9

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).
Note. Figures are based on 2009–2011 average trade values.

Table 4. COMESA and China: Mutual Importance in Merchandise Trade
COMESA exports to China as % of

2000

2005

2011

3.1

6.6

16.1

0.6

0.7

0.9

4.1

7.5

10.6

0.5

0.7

1.2

COMESA world exports
China exports to COMESA as % of
China world exports
COMESA imports from China as %
of COMESA world imports
China imports from COMESA as %
of China world imports

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).

International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014

33

Table 5. Share of China in Merchandise Exports and Imports of COMESA Countries (%)
2000

2011

Exports

Imports

Exports

Imports

Burundi

1.5

3.8

2.3

8.4

Comoros

0.03

0.6

0.01

4.8

Congo, Dem. Rep.

0.1

2.8

45.7

16.0

0.03

12.0

0.2

19.2

Egypt

0.8

4.6

3.1

10.1

Eritrea

0.2

0.7

0.2

29.4

Ethiopia

0.2

7.7

10.8

19.3

Kenya

0.2

3.9

1.1

12.6

Libya

0.2

1.4

10.1

9.6

Madagascar

0.7

9.0

6.2

18.3

Djibouti

Malawi

0.03

1.6

3.9

8.5

Mauritius

0.1

7.6

0.2

12.1

Rwanda

2.9

2.0

13.5

6.1

Seychelles

0.05

1.1

0.1

1.8

Sudan

41.3

10.0

56.4

21.6

Swaziland

0.02

0.3

0.04

9.1

Uganda

0.1

2.6

1.9

9.1

Zambia
Zimbabwe

4.6
5.2

2.1
1.9

32.5
16.0

9.8
8.7

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).

Regarding bilateral trade balance, it has been usually in deficit for COMESA. This is born
out by Figure 1. There was a bilateral trade deficit of about US$579 million for COMESA as a
bloc in 2000. It then narrowed to US$299 million in 2005, and it was even replaced by trade
surpluses during 2006–2007 due to a higher growth of exports to China over imports from China.
COMESA’s bilateral trade balance subsequently worsened to show deficits during 2008–2009 in
the face of a sharp drop in exports growth before it registered a trade surplus in 2010 as exports
increased dramatically. But the trade balance turned deficit for COMESA once again in 2011
owing mainly to a high rise in imports and the deficit peaked at US$1.3 billion for the period.
COMESA’s exports of petroleum and related products (mainly from Sudan and Libya) exert a
significant influence on the balance of trade with China. It can be seen from Figure 1 that without
these commodities, the trade deficits for COMESA would be continuous and even higher.
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-5000
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US$ Million

0

5000

Figure 1. COMESA’s Trade Balance with China

2005
Year

2000
Trade balance

2010

Trade balance excl. petroleum products

Source: UNCTAD (2013).
Note. Trade balance is obtained as COMESA’s merchandise exports to China minus COMESA’s
merchandise imports from China.

This trade imbalance can be explained by, among other things, the structure of the twoway trade. COMESA exports to China lack diversification and are heavily concentrated in primary
commodities with limited value addition (Figure 2). They are particularly driven by petroleum and
related products, which account for 60% of the value of total COMESA exports to China. The next
important export commodities are ores and metals (31%). By contrast, COMESA imports from
China are largely comprised of manufactures. Machinery and transport equipment account for 43%
of the value of total COMESA imports from China, followed by miscellaneous manufactured
articles such as articles of apparel, clothing accessories, footwear and furniture (16%), textile yarn
and related products (11%), and chemical products (8%). Other manufactured goods together
constitute 18% of COMESA imports from China.
The above structure of COMESA-China trade is consistent with Zafar’s (2007) argument
that trade between Africa and China closely follows “what would be expected from comparative
advantage and the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model,” with Africa exporting primary
commodities and China exporting manufactures. However, there are concerns (e.g., Kaplinsky &
Morris, 2008) that such trade pattern could narrow the space for industrial development and
economic diversification of a regional grouping like COMESA.

International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014

35

Figure 2. Product Composition of COMESA’s Trade with China
COMESA Exports to China

Manufactured
goods
Food items
3%
4%

Agricultural
raw materials
2%

Ores and
metals
31%

Petroleum and
related
products
60%

COMESA Imports from China
Chemical
products
8%
Other
manufactured
goods
18%

Textile yarn
and related
products
11%

Primary
commodities
4%
Machinery
and transport
equipment
43%

Miscellaneous
manufactured
articles
16%

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).
Note: Figures are based on 2009–11 average trade values.

Gravity Model and Econometric Issues
Gravity Model
The gravity model of bilateral trade has been extensively applied in the empirical literature
on international economics since its first introduction by Tinbergen (1962). One of its most popular
applications has been simulation of bilateral trade potentials (Baldwin, 1994; Brenton & Di Mauro
1998; Chionis & Liargovas 2002). In the traditional concept of gravity model, bilateral trade can
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be explained by national incomes and both trade impediment and preference factors (Egger, 2002).
As in Deardorff (1995), the simple version of gravity model can be specified as
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝐴

𝑌𝑖 𝑌𝑗
,
𝐷𝑖𝑗

(1)

where 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the value of exports from country i to country j, the 𝑌’s are national incomes of the
two countries, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is geographical distance between them, and 𝐴 is a constant of proportionality.
Bilateral trade is thus directly related to national income and inversely related to geographical
distance.
Notwithstanding gravity model’s consistent empirical success (Bergstrand, 1985), the
model was initially criticized for lack of strong theoretical foundations. Anderson (1979), however,
settled this criticism when he derived the model from constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
preferences and goods that are differentiated by region of origin. The gravity model has since been
derived from different trade theories, including Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and increasing returns
to scale theories (Evenett & Keller, 2002).
Another major criticism has been specifically related to the projection of bilateral trade
potentials. Some studies used “in-sample” trade projection, meaning that they estimate the gravity
equation on a sample including the countries of interest and then define trade potential by the
residuals of the estimated equation (Baldwin, 1994). The in-sample approach is, however, severely
criticized by Egger (2002), who argues that systematic variations in residuals reflect
misspecification of the econometric model rather than trade potential. The alternative approach is
to use “out-of-sample” trade projection (Chionis & Liargovas 2002). The out-of-sample approach
excludes the countries of interest from the sample while estimating the gravity equation and then
applies the parameter estimates derived by the reference sample to the countries of interest in order
to predict their “natural” trade flows. The difference between the actual and the predicted trade
flows is then interpreted as unrealized trade potential. This approach is most appropriate when the
countries of interest are in the early stage of transformation (Egger, 2002). In this study, the outof-sample technique is used to estimate the trade potential between COMESA countries and China
by excluding the former from the estimated equation.
Econometric Issues
Major concerns have been raised on the choice of econometric estimation techniques in
empirical gravity models. For instance, Mátyás (1997) criticizes cross-section approaches and
argues that the correct econometric specification of the gravity model is a triple-indexed model
with exporter, importer and time effects. This means that conclusions on trade potentials based on
ordinary least squares (OLS) technique are problematic (Egger, 2002). But the gravity literature
has been less clear as to how to treat country-specific effects. Egger (2000) advocates a fixed
effects model on the basis of a Hausman (1978) specification test and an intuitive argument that
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country effects are widely predetermined. Mátyás (1998), on the other hand, argues that for some
datasets, it may be more appropriate to formalize these effects as random variables, which leads to
a random effects model.
Both fixed effects and random effects approaches have limitations, however. The fixed
effects approach has two shortcomings. First, it eliminates from the model observed time-invariant
characteristics (such as distance), all of which are simply absorbed into the fixed effects (Greene,
2003). Second, it cannot be used for out-of-sample trade prediction unless one makes ad hoc
assumptions to decompose the fixed effects into a component that is common across the trade
partners and one that is specific to the partner (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). The random effects
treatment does allow the model to include time-invariant variables. But the main drawback of the
random effects approach is that it assumes, with little justification, that the random effects are
uncorrelated with the regressors. If the correlation exists, then the resulting estimator is
inconsistent (Greene, 2003).
For the purpose of the present paper, McPherson and Trumbull’s suggestion is followed,
which is to apply the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator of panel data. Hausman-Taylor
estimator is an instrumental variables estimator of the random effects model that uses only the
information within the model (Greene, 2003). It is appealing for two reasons. First, it allows for
the inclusion of time-invariant variables and generates out-of-sample trade forecasts without the
need to make any ad hoc assumptions required by the fixed effects estimator. Second, it removes
the correlation between the random effects and the regressors, which is the cause of the rejection
of standard random effects estimator. Thus, time-invariant variables can be consistently estimated
without compromising the estimates for time-varying variables (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008).
Other econometric estimation choices that matter for results obtained from the gravity
equation include choice of dependent variable, measure of variables (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006),
functional form (Sanso, Cuairan, & Sanz 1993; Coe, Subramanian, & Tamirisa, 2007) and
treatment of zero trade observations (Baldwin 1994; Brülhart & Kelly, 1999).
Empirical Evidence of COMESA-China Trade Potential
Empirical Model
The empirical model employed in this study is the gravity model of McPherson and
Trumbull (2008). The general specification of the model follows the econometric specification of
the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator:
′
′
′
′
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽1 + 𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽2 + 𝑍1𝑖𝑗
𝛿1 + 𝑍2𝑖𝑗
𝛿2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is defined as the value of imports of country i from country j in year t, 𝑋1 are variables
that are time-varying and uncorrelated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋2 are variables that are time-varying and
correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑍1 are variables that are time-invariant and uncorrelated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , and 𝑍2 are
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variables that are time-invariant and correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 . 𝛼 is a constant term, and 𝛽1 , 𝛽2, 𝛿1 and
𝛿2 are vectors of slope parameters. (𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) is a compound disturbance, where 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is country
pair-specific unobserved random effect that does not vary over time and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error component
that varies in both the country pair and time dimensions.
As pointed out by Greene (2003), it is the likely presence of 𝑋2 and 𝑍2 that complicates
estimation of the random effects model. The Hausman-Taylor strategy is to estimate equation (2)
by instrumental variables technique. There is no need to use external instruments. First, 𝑋1 and 𝑋2
are transformed into their deviations from group means, as in fixed effects estimation. The group
mean deviations can then be used as instrumental variables. Second, because 𝑍1 is exogenous by
definition, it can also serve as a group of instrumental variables. Finally, the group means of 𝑋1
can serve as instruments for 𝑍2 , and the model will be identified so long as the number of variables
in 𝑋1 is at least as large as the number of variables in 𝑍2 .
Following McPherson and Trumbull, 𝑋1 contains per capita GDPs (𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 ),
populations (𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 ) and the absolute value of the difference in index of economic
freedom (𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) of the trade partners i and j. For 𝑋2, the model includes the index of economic
freedom of each partner (𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 ) and the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita
of the partners (𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 ). It is argued that levels of economic freedom and difference in GDP
per capita are likely to be correlated with other governmental, institutional, geographical or social
characteristics not explicitly included in the model and captured by 𝜇𝑖𝑗 . 𝑍1 comprises geographical
distance between trade partners (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 ) and dummy variables for both partners with common
land border (𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑗 ), common language (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 ) and regional trade agreement (𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 ). For 𝑍2 ,
the model has dummies for both trade partners with a communist past (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) and both having a
non-communist past (𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ). There is a potential for having a communist or non-communist
past to be correlated with characteristics related to trade barriers, competitive markets or
longstanding relationships that are included in 𝜇𝑖𝑗 (McPherson and Trumbull 2008). Hence, the
estimated gravity equation may be written in log-linear form as
ln 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽11 ln 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 ln 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13 ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽15 ln 𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽21 ln 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22 ln 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽23 ln 𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛿11 ln 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿12 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿13 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿14 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿21 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛿22 𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(3)

Typically, a positive sign is expected for 𝛽11 , 𝛽12 , 𝛿12 , 𝛿13 , 𝛿14 and 𝛿22 . Importer’s per
capita GDP as a measure of income and exporter’s per capita GDP as a measure of the variety of
output are expected to have a positive impact on bilateral trade (Baldwin, 1994). Dummies for
common land border and language are used to capture information costs. Countries with common
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language and border tend to trade more with each other due to lower information (search) costs
resulting from better knowledge of each other’s “business practices, competitiveness and delivery
reliability” (Piermartini & Teh, 2005). Regional trade agreements are intended to reduce tariffs
and other barriers to trade between countries. Hence, they are likely to have a positive effect on
trade among members (Frankel, Stein & Wei, 1995). Communist countries, McPherson and
Trumbull argue, are historically associated with closed economies that are less open to trade. Thus,
trade is also likely to be higher between countries that do not have a communist past.
The coefficients of 𝛽15, 𝛽21, 𝛽22, 𝛽23, 𝛿11 and 𝛿21 , on the other hand, are expected to have
a negative sign. The absolute value of the difference in per capita GDP between countries measures
economic distance (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). This variable has an expected negative sign
because according to the Linder hypothesis, countries with similar levels of income per capita will
exhibit similar tastes, produce similar but differentiated products and trade more among
themselves (Roberts, 2004). High levels of economic freedom signify low levels of government,
social, or political barriers to trade. The index of economic freedom is such that a higher value
indicates less freedom, and therefore a negative sign is expected (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008).
Following the spirit of the Linder hypothesis, the closer two countries are in terms of their
economic freedom levels, the more likely they are to trade. The greater the distance between two
trade partners, the higher the transportation costs and hence the less the two-way trade (Bergstrand,
1985). Countries with a communist past tend to trade less and thus a negative coefficient is
assigned for this dummy variable.
As for the coefficients of population, they are theoretically ambiguous. The population
coefficient of the exporting country (𝛽14) may be negatively or positively signed, depending on
whether the country exports less when it is big (absorption effect) or whether a big country exports
more than a small country (economies of scale). For similar reasons, the population coefficient of
the importing country (𝛽13) may also assume a positive or negative sign (Martinez-Zarzoso &
Nowak-Lehmann, 2003).
In line with the out-of-sample technique of trade projection, the above gravity coefficients
are estimated using trade flows between a reference sample of countries that exclude the COMESA
region. Then the coefficient estimates derived by the reference sample are applied to COMESAChina data to predict their potential or “natural” trade flows. This calculation can be done as
follows (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008):
′ ̂
′ ̂
̂𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼̂ + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀
𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝛿,

(4)

̂ denotes the predicted value of 𝑀. 𝛼̂, 𝛽̂ and 𝛿̂ refer to the coefficient estimates. 𝑋 and 𝑍
where 𝑀
̂ is to
stand for the time-varying and time-invariant variables, respectively. In the final analysis, 𝑀
be compared with 𝑀 to assess the magnitude of unrealized trade potential.

40

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad

The Data
The dataset contains annual data for 43 selected countries covering the period 2000–11.
The countries encompass developed as well as developing economies of the world, which are
assumed to be well integrated into the international market. 14 The dependent variable is bilateral
merchandise imports in thousands of current US dollars sourced from UNCTAD (2013).
Therefore, the potential number of total observations is 21,672 (= 43 × 42 × 12) for the twelveyear period. The dependent variable takes on a zero value for only 45 observations (due to missing
trade flows), which ensures 21,627 observations in the regression model. Data on GDP per capita
in current US dollars and population are drawn from World Bank (2013). Indices of economic
freedom are obtained from the Heritage Foundation (2013). Each of these indices has ten
components of economic freedom, ranging from property rights to financial freedom. Bilateral
distances are derived from CEPII (2012). The distances refer to great-circle distances in kilometers
between the capital cities of trade partners.
Border and language dummy variables are compiled from CEPII (2012). The border
dummy takes the value 1 for a pair of countries (i, j) with a common land border, and 0 otherwise.
The language dummy has the value 1 if both countries have a common official language, and 0
otherwise. The dummy variable for regional trade agreement is created using information obtained
from WTO (2013). The regional trade agreements include free trade agreements and customs
unions. This dummy has the value 1 for a pair of countries with membership in the same regional
trade agreement, and 0 otherwise. Finally, data on dummy variables for a communist and noncommunist past come from Information Please (2013). One of the dummy variables (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) has
the value 1 if trading countries i and j both have a communist past; 0 otherwise. The other dummy
(𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) equals 1 if both countries have a non-communist past; 0 otherwise.
The Results
The estimates for OLS, fixed effects, random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators of
equation (3) are reported in Table 6. They are obtained by STATA Version 12 software package.
The F test statistic is 161.36 and is significant at the 1% level. This indicates the presence of
unobserved bilateral effects and hence inappropriateness of the OLS technique. The Hausman
(1978) test based on the difference between the fixed effects and random effects estimators gives
an observed chi-squared value of 1482.81. This is significant at the 1% level and reveals that the
random effects model suffers from correlation between the explanatory variables and the bilateral
effects. This suggests the fixed estimater is better choice. But, as already noted, the effects of all
time-invariant variables are eliminated in a fixed effects approach.

14

For list of the countries used in reference sample, see Appendix, Table A1.
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Table 6. Gravity Model Estimates for the Reference Sample (Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Bilateral Imports)
OLS

Random Effects

–46.631*** (0.513)

–15.852*** (0.615)

Importer per capita GDP

0.670*** (0.010)

0.730*** (0.011)

0.855*** (0.014)

0.817*** (0.013)

0.854*** (0.014)

Exporter per capita GDP

0.661*** (0.010)

0.517*** (0.011)

0.528*** (0.014)

0.500*** (0.013)

0.529*** (0.014)

–0.025*** (0.006)

–0.026*** (0.005)

–0.020*** (0.005)

–0.020*** (0.005)

–0.020*** (0.005)

0.918*** (0.006)

0.784*** (0.018)

0.548*** (0.103)

0.565*** (0.071)

0.474*** (0.099)

Constant

Difference in per capita GDP
Importer population

Fixed Effects

HT I

—

HT II

4.109

(4.784)

–15.355

(17.692)

0.970*** (0.006)

0.726*** (0.018)

–0.977*** (0.103)

–0.140** (0.071)

–0.902*** (0.099)

–0.881*** (0.011)

–0.872*** (0.034)

—

–0.635*** (0.233)

6.258*** (1.839)

Importer freedom index

2.502*** (0.083)

–0.253*** (0.064)

–0.436*** (0.065)

–0.453*** (0.063)

–0.444*** (0.065)

Exporter freedom index

2.823*** (0.083)

–0.041

(0.064)

–0.447*** (0.065)

–0.366*** (0.063)

–0.438*** (0.065)

Difference in freedom index

0.023** (0.010)

–0.022*** (0.007)

–0.029*** (0.007)

–0.031*** (0.006)

–0.029*** (0.007)

Common border

0.526*** (0.041)

0.556*** (0.136)

—

1.911

(1.659)

Common language

0.458*** (0.027)

0.767*** (0.088)

—

0.930

(0.654)

14.020*** (3.995)

Regional trade agreement

0.134*** (0.019)

–0.065

(0.061)

—

–0.264

(0.369)

6.408*** (2.119)

Both communist

0.635*** (0.060)

0.295

(0.199)

—

–13.963

(28.436)

46.616 (100.174)

Both non-communist

0.134*** (0.019)

0.427*** (0.060)

—

–1.763

(4.487)

–43.447** (19.049)

Exporter population
Distance

Number of observations
Number of groups
R-squared
Bilateral effects: F(1803, 19815)
Hausman specification test: χ2(8)

21627

21627

21627

21627

21627

—

1804

1804

1804

1804

0.771

0.726

0.577

—

—

—
—

—
1482.81***

161.36***
—

—
148.90***

—
8.49

Notes: 1. All explanatory variables except dummies are expressed in natural logarithms.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
3. OLS standard errors are not adjusted for the variance components.
4. Estimates in HT I column are Hausman-Taylor estimates according to McPherson and Trumbull (2008).
5. Estimates in HT II column are Hausman-Taylor estimates with endogenous importer and exporter per capita GDPs,
holding everything else the same as in McPherson and Trumbull.
*** and ** denote level of statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
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(5.847)

The Hausman-Taylor estimates of the gravity equation are presented in the final two columns
of Table 6. The HT I column refers to the specification of McPherson and Trumbull with their
choice of exogenous and endogenous variables as in equation (3). The time-varying parameter
estimates are generally close to their fixed effects counterparts. They also have the expected signs,
except for regional trade agreement and common non-communist past. However, the effects of all
time-invariant variables, except for bilateral distance, are not estimated significantly. Furthermore,
the Hausman test based on the difference between the fixed effects and HT I estimators produces
a chi-squared value of 148.90, which is significant at the 1% level. This means that the hypothesis
that the results of HT I are generated from valid set of instruments is rejected.
To correct this problem in the original model, the results are checked for sensitivity to
alternative choices of the exogenous time-varying variables (Baltagi & Khanti-Akom, 1990). The
HT II column of Table 6 presents the results for a model where the importer and exporter per capita
GDPs (𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 ) are treated as endogenous (correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 ), keeping everything
else the same as in McPherson and Trumbull (2008). The Hausman test for this specification yields
a highly insignificant chi-squared value of 8.49, so the legitimacy of the instrument set is not
rejected. Nearly all the estimated parameters of the time-varying variables have moved even closer
to the fixed effects parameters. This confirms that it has been possible to separate the effects of
time-invariant variables using the Hausman-Taylor estimator without compromising the parameter
estimates of the time-varying variables (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). HT II, therefore, is the
preferred model in this study.
Most coefficient estimates of HT II have the expected sign and statistically significant effect
on bilateral trade. It has been possible to successfully estimate the effect of common language and
regional trade agreement—time-invariant variables that would be dropped in the fixed effects
estimation. As in McPherson and Trumbull’s study, common border turns out to have an
insignificant effect on trade and, contrary to expectations, the distance variable has a positive effect
but here it is also statistically significant. Likewise, the effects of common communist and noncommunist past have the wrong sign but only the latter is statistically significant at the 5% level.
As a next step, the HT II coefficient estimates are used to predict COMESA countries’
“natural” trade values with China, according to equation (4). For the sake of convenience in
interpreting trade potential, average ratios of actual to predicted trade values are calculated for the
period 2009–2011. A ratio of less than one indicates unutilized trade potential. Table 7 reports the
results. It appears that all COMESA countries are trading with China far below their potential. The
average ratios of actual to predicted trade are found to be less than one half. In fact, in all but one
of the cases, actual imports and exports fall more than 60 percentage points under their “natural”
levels (a ratio of less than 0.40). This may not be surprising given that China and COMESA
countries have strengthened their bilateral trade ties only recently. The results also confirm
expectations of other authors (Jenkins & Edwards, 2005).
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Despite some striking similarities, Table 7 shows that the export ratios are generally lower
than the import ratios. In other words, COMESA’s exports to China have performed worse than
its imports have. It seems that China has targeted the COMESA market more aggressively than
COMESA has targeted the Chinese market. Within the COMESA region, the ratios of actual to
expected exports to China are particularly low for small countries such as Comoros, Eritrea and
Seychelles, while they are relatively higher for Sudan and Libya (both predominantly oil
exporters), as well as Egypt and Zambia. As far as imports from China are concerned, Egypt is the
highest performer in the regional grouping with actual values of more than 40% of the expected
amount, while Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia are the lowest performers
with 14–17%. In sum, though, these results offer robust indication for bright prospects for
COMESA-China trade.
Table 7. Ratio of COMESA Countries’ Actual to Predicted Trade with China
Imports

Exports

Burundi

0.30

0.18

Comoros

0.26

0.05

Congo, Dem. Rep.

0.16

0.16

Djibouti

0.32

0.12

Egypt

0.41

0.33

Eritrea

0.14

0.07

Ethiopia

0.17

0.14

Kenya

0.38

0.25

Libya

0.36

0.33

Madagascar

0.35

0.26

Malawi

0.32

0.23

Mauritius

0.35

0.19

Rwanda

0.31

0.24

Seychelles

0.26

0.08

Sudan

0.38

0.37

Swaziland

0.28

0.16

Uganda

0.35

0.24

Zambia
Zimbabwe

0.33
0.33

0.32
0.28

Note: Trade ratios are calculated based on average data for 2009–2011.
Two implications can be drawn from the above results. First, there appear to be significant
trade impediments between COMESA and China. The two-way trade is likely to continue to
expand with more trade-enhancing policy measures on both sides. The measures might be toward
reducing bilateral trade barriers as well as developing COMESA’s exporting capabilities. Second,
COMESA and China need to anticipate the developmental impacts from future expansion of the
bilateral trade. The impacts may be far-reaching, inasmuch as the bilateral trade potential is
enormous.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the trade patterns and potential between COMESA and China. The
empirical analysis shows that the bilateral trade has seen a high growth rate in the 2000s, and that
COMESA exports to China are largely driven by primary products (particularly oil) while the
imports are manufactures in the main. The natural resource-rich economies of Sudan, Libya,
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia account for the lion’s share of COMESA’s exports
to China. Two other imbalances in COMESA’s current trade integration with China are worth
noting. First, whereas China has become a major trade partner of COMESA (although the
significance varies widely between individual COMESA member states), the share of COMESA
in China’s overall trade profile remains small by comparison. Second, the bilateral trade balance
in the review period was often in China’s favor, which is partly a reflection of the nature of
products moving between the two regions.
The paper obtains indicative estimates of the potential to increase the COMESA-China
trade based on the gravity model of McPherson and Trumbull (2008). The model fits the data
reasonably well. Comparing actual and estimated “natural” trade flows indicates that the
COMESA countries and China are trading much lower than their potential suggests, falling by
more than 60 percentage points.
These findings carry policy implications for COMESA-China trade. First, there is a clear
need for COMESA to diversify its export pattern—product-wise and country-wise—in order to
better exploit the Chinese market as well as balance the bilateral trade in the longer run. With a
single commodity and only four member countries dominating COMESA’s exports to China, there
is considerable room for improvement in exporting capabilities.
Second, significant trade restrictions seem to exist, preventing the bilateral trade from
reaching its potential. Thus, activities geared toward reducing existing bilateral trade barriers are
likely to produce positive results. It is recommended that the policy package needs to look at not
only formal trade policy variables but also domestic “behind-the-border” business environment
and “between-the-border” factors, such as trade facilitation infrastructure (Broadman, 2007).
Finally, it helps both China and particularly COMESA to weigh the benefits and costs of
the bilateral trade in terms of their overall development strategies. This paper estimates—
conditional on the model used—the unrealized trade potential to be high. It is thus anticipated that
any effects on economic development will deepen as the bilateral trade continues to expand in the
future.
It is worth noting that estimation of trade potential in the gravity model setup can be done
either at the aggregate or sectoral level. The results presented here are drawn from aggregated
exports and imports. It is possible that within the aggregates, trade in particular products may be
in line with the expected level (Brenton & Di Mauro, 1998). Future work may thus obtain richer
policy implications from further disaggregation of data.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of Countries in Gravity Model Regression
Developed Countries

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of

46

Developing Countries

Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
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Environment Stress and Increased Vulnerability to Impoverishment in Rural
Ethiopia: Case Studies Evidence
Tesfaye Teklu15
Abstract: Integral to the global trends in climate change, there are slow but notable
long-term changes in level of weather (e.g. slow increase in temperature and decline
in rainfall) accompanied with increased weather extremes such as increased
frequency and intensity of drought in Ethiopia. These changes are occurring over
large geographical area including the most populous and arable highlands. Rural
households in these environmentally stressed areas employ multiple strategies to
manage environmental risk. However, as evident from the empirical regularities
below, vulnerability to poverty persists because of households’ diminished capacity
to mitigate and cope with frequent occurrence of weather extremes. The key
development challenge is to reduce both structural poverty and vulnerability to
poverty.
Introduction
Ethiopia has a diverse biophysical environment. Its land formations fall broadly into
highlands and lowlands with the highlands representing areas above 1500 meters above sea level.
According to the latest agro-ecological mapping (NMSA, 1996), about 55 percent of the total land
area constitutes moisture-stressed arid and semi-arid areas with crop growing period of less than
four months. Areas with a longer and dependable crop growing period are found in the remaining
45 percent of the total land area, mainly in moist and humid highlands.
The majority of the population is rural and lives mainly in the highlands, particularly in the
mid-elevation where the climate is hospitable and land resources are suitable to grow a large
variety of crop and livestock species (Mesfin Woldemariam, 1991; Aynalem Adugna, 1987).
However, land degradation is severe especially in the long settled highlands. Some of the
highlanders are gradually abandoning the mid-elevation and moving upwards where the
temperature is cold or descending onto the lowlands where the climate is less favorable for
settlement and cultivation (for example, the cases of South Wello and Northern Shewa in Mesfin
Woldemariam, 1991). The transition zone between the highland and lowland is increasingly
encroached by highlanders descending into lower elevation and pastoral herders moving upwards
from the arid lowlands in search of grazing lands and water.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the rural population. Farming systems are diverse
corresponding with the heterogeneity of the physical environment; mixed farming systems where
crops and livestock are combined with trees in the settled highlands, extensive pastoral-based
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livestock farming system in the arid lowlands, and agro-pastoralism in the highland and lowland
transition zone where seasonal migration with livestock is combined with rain-fed cultivation.
But rural households are rarely purely agricultural households. Typically, their income
sources are diversified comprising non-farm incomes where some are non-local involving
migration. Environmental goods and services are significant in these diversified incomes; they are
key inputs into agricultural production (e.g. soil and water), and sources of household incomes
(e.g. sale of forest products) and consumption (e.g. fuel).
Living standards are low in terms of both economic and social deprivation metrics (e.g.
income poverty, under or malnutrition, and poor health outcomes). Poverty16 is largely rural in
terms of share of total poverty. The rural poor are found in all agro-ecological zones. Although the
evidence on the relationship between poverty and production environments is not adequately
established, it is plausible the majority of the rural poor are in areas favorable for agricultural
production because of large concentration of population. However, incidence of poverty is higher
in marginal agricultural areas such as arid and semi-arid areas (e.g. Elizabeth Woldemariam, 1997;
Bigsten et al, 2003; and Getaneh Gobeze, 1999).
Furthermore, studies on vulnerability to poverty establish substantial presence of rural
households whose mean income (or, consumption level) is above poverty line but sometime fall
into poverty (transitory poverty). Such mobility of people into and out of poverty over time looms
large particularly in marginal agricultural areas, which is often related to considerable exposure of
the population to environmental risk. For example, Deracon and Krishnan (1998) find sizable
transitory poverty related to fluctuation in rainfall, holding other factors constant.
The thrust of this short synthesis paper is to relate vulnerability to poverty from the
perspective of household capacity to manage environmental risk. Section two presents case studies
drawn from different agro-ecological zones to demonstrate the links between environmental stress
and vulnerability to poverty. Section three attempts to decipher empirical regularities in the links.
The final section reiterates the key environment and poverty links.
Environmental change and impoverishment
Ethiopia’s natural resource base is continuously and cumulatively degrading. Natural
vegetation including high forests and permanent pasture is depleting both in area coverage and
loss of species. Soil degradation occurs extensively in arable land as manifested in soil erosion,
biological degradation (i.e., loss of organic matter), chemical degradation (i.e., loss of nutrients)
and physical degradation (i.e., poor water infiltration and restricted aeration in rooting system).
The rangelands in the lowlands are undergoing similar deterioration including desertification in
the arid margins.
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There is also evidence of slow but notable climate change as evident from long-term trend
in weather variables, particularly in rainfall and temperature (Tesfaye Haile, 1986; Workineh
Degefa, 1987; NMSA, 1996; Mahdi Osman, 2001). Level of temperature is increasing over time.
Drier conditions are particularly notable in arid and semi-arid areas. And level of rainfall is
declining accompanied by increasing spatial and temporal variability. These weather changes are
pronounced in arid and semi-arid areas and extending to the most populous and arable highlands
(e.g. Mahdi Osman, 2001 for the central highlands).
The degradation of the natural resources combined with the climate change have rendered
some of the areas of the country to serious environmental stress. Households living in these areas
employ multiple strategies to manage environmental risk; smooth income (e.g. selective disposal
or dispersal of assets, diversification into non-farm income and migration for employment) and
consumption (budget-reallocation, switching to low-cost diet, reducing size and frequency of
meals, dependency on borrowing or transfers). But still some of the households fall into poverty
as evident from the case studies below.
The Case of South Wello
South Wello zone in northeast Ethiopia represents areas of long-settled northern highlands
with variable topography, severe land degradation, frequent droughts and increased
impoverishment. The zone is mostly mountainous and plateaus with rugged tops, and severely
broken and long steep slopes. The soils are variable and commonly low in soil organic matter and
macronutrients, particularly in the degraded landscapes. The rainfall regime is mainly bimodal.
The eastern parts of South Wello, the lowlands in particular, experience low rainfall, high
variability and frequent droughts.
South Wello is long settled with the majority living in rural areas. The rural population is
mainly concentrated in the mid-elevations with better rainfall and soil. But the numbers are
growing in very fragile and marginally areas within the highlands. And, in spite of problems of
low and erratic rainfall, the highland farmers are encroaching the lowlands and compete for scarce
land and water with agro-pastoral and pastoral population.
Land degradation is extensive and severe (Belay Tegene, 2000). Very little natural forests
exists in the mid to high elevation except in remote steep lands with gradients of more than 60
percent (see in particular the studies in Mesfin Woldemariam, 1993; Kebrom Tekle and Hedlund,
2000). The process of deforestation has progressed to the lower elevations with significant
contraction of woody biomass.
Nearly all the arable land is already converted into farmland, especially in the most
populated highland plateaus. Farmers are pushing land expansion onto topographically marginal
areas marked with steep slopes and shallow soils. The indigenous soil fertility practices are on
decline and application of improved technology is not adequate to compensate for loss of nutrients.
Both crop and forage productivity is on long-term decline caused mainly by falling soil fertility.
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With increasing land scarcity, and declining soil fertility and farm productivity, farmers
are under subsistence pressure particularly in moisture stressed areas where there is a strong link
between rainfall and agricultural productivity. Secular decline in rainfall translates into large
decline into agricultural production as evidenced in South Wello in 1973/74 (Mesfin
Woldemariam, 1984), in 1984/85 (Dessalegn Rahamato, 1991) and in 1999/2000 (Yared et al,
2000).
There are signs today that the ability of the rural population to mitigate and cope with
recurrent droughts remains tenuous: physical assets are depleting, farm productivity is declining,
non-agricultural income sources are not sufficient to compensate the loss in farm income, “freely”
available forest resources are thinning, long-distant employment is scarce, social support networks
are falling, and surviving on lowered food intake is constrained by low body adaptability.
The Case of Wollaita Zone
The administrative zone represents the southern highlands that are commonly characterized
by diverse agro-ecology, high population density, scarce arable and grazing lands, intensive
agriculture, chronic food deficit, and increasing vulnerability to poverty. It has a variable
topography. The climate is sub-humid in the highlands and semi-arid. The rural population is long
settled and it is distributed vertically with the largest concentration in mid-elevation where
population density is high (exceeding 500 persons per km in some districts). The pressure on arable
land is intense in these high-density areas (e.g. Eyasu Elias, 2002).
The population is dependent on farming for its livelihoods. Outside agriculture, the rural
households generate income from non-farm sources including remittance from migrants. Although
income sources are diversified, the majority of the population lives on subsistence margin: own
little or no land and livestock, deficit in food production, and dependent on marginal non-farm
income (Bush, 2002). The rural population is vulnerable to frequent occurrence of droughts (as in
1984, 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2000). Based on reports of oral historians in Wollaita district in
southern Ethiopia, Dagnew Eshete (1995) identifies seven major food shortage and famine years
over the period between 1963 and 1991: 1963/64, 1965/66, 1970/71, 1980/81, 1983/85, 1987/88,
and 1990/91.
There are signs of increasing vulnerability to poverty, particularly in the drier areas. First,
the resilience of enset as ‘famine crop’ has diminished since the major droughts of the mid-1980s.
Second, ownership of livestock has declined because of shortage of grazing areas and feed
availability, drought and animal disease, and forced liquidation in time of crop failure and slow
recovery. Third, non-farm income opportunity is scarce.
With declining farm size and productivity, livestock ownership and non-farm income
opportunity, the capacity of the rural population has diminished to cope with drought risk,
particularly among the already poor.

International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014

53

The Arid and Semi-arid pastoral areas
The arid and hot semi-arid zones cover a large mass of land area with distinct biophysical
characteristics: low and variable rainfall, low inherent soil fertility, severe moisture stress, and
sparse vegetative cover. Water is scarce. And moisture stress is the chief limiting factor for crop
production. There is no growing season or there is a growing season but not sufficient to grow
crops (Engida Mersha, 2000).
The majority of the pastoral population, who accounts 12-13% of the Ethiopian population,
inhabits these agro-climatic zones (e.g., the Afar in northeast, the Somalis in east and southeast
lowlands, and the Borans in the south).
The pastoral system is based on extensive livestock husbandry involving raising mixed
herds that are resistant to drought conditions, moving between wet-season and dry-season grazing
areas to take advantage of spatial variation in forage and water availability, adjusting herd
composition and size according to climatic condition (for example, Desta Solomon et al 2002 noted
a shift from cattle towards goats and camels to increase drought resistance, flexibility in grazing
requirements, and ease of converting into cash). Livestock are the major sources of income (e.g.,
exchange livestock and products for grains), diets (e.g., milk and meat) and social status. Smallscale crop production is practiced along riverbanks, and pockets of land that are suitable for
cultivation.
The pastoral economy is continuously diversifying. As the recent evidence shows, agropastoralism involving livestock and crop production is rapidly growing. The numbers of pastorals
shifting towards trading in livestock (i.e., business of selling milk, live animals and butchery),
trading in beverages and crafts, wage employment, gathering and selling collected firewood and
charcoal, renting property, and retail shops (e.g. Little et al 2001). There are more people
diversifying into low-return income sources with increased risk exposure such as wage
employment (men), collecting and selling forest products, trading beverages and crafts (female).
Despite continuous diversification, however, the pastoral population now faces elevated
environmental risk and impoverishment. Several factors work in tandem. First, environmental
stress has increased due to aridity and frequent droughts. Second, shrinkage of pastoral territory
amidst increased aridity limits pooling climatic risks over a large geographic space and thereby
increases likelihood of decline in range production and livestock. Third, the traditional drought
management mechanisms (e.g., diversification of herds, mobility, livestock sharing, and reciprocal
grazing) are not as effective to mitigate drought-induced excess depletion of livestock. Fourth,
frequent occurrences of droughts in a context of ineffective drought management system cause
substantial decline in livestock population due to excess deaths and distress sales. Fifth, the shift
to other income sources is mean-income reducing while simultaneously increasing income risk.
Sixth, indigenous institutions that effectively managed common property resources, support
networks, and conflicts are falling apart without a viable replacement. Finally, livestock markets,
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particularly in local/primary markets where the participation of pastoralists is high, are poorly
developed.
Key Processes Underlying Vulnerability to Poverty
In all the above cases, there are notable regularities that indicate increased environmental
risk (frequent and intense occurrence of droughts in particular), diminished household capacity to
mitigate and cope with drought risk, and loss in household welfare (income poverty and hunger).
Increased frequency of droughts
The location-specific case studies confirm the long-term changes in level of weather
variables accompanied with increased extremes such as increased frequency of drought. Critical
to performance in agricultural production is the low predictability of the distribution of the weather
variables like rainfall during crop growing period.
Declining soil fertility and crop productivity
The evidence from the above cases points to at least three factors contributing to declining
crop productivity: (1) extensive soil erosion, (2) continuous cultivation without adequate soil
fertility management (i.e., abandoning gradually the practices of fallowing land, growing
leguminous crops in crop rotation, and application of organic fertilizers such as crop residues and
manure), and (3) expansion of cultivation into marginal areas (i.e., steep slopes, low rainfall zone,
shallow area) that are inherently deficient in essential soil properties. With both farm size and yield
declining, crop production falls from already low initial level. In addition, crop production is also
highly variable in moisture stressed areas where there is a strong link between rainfall and crop
yield. Frequent occurrences of droughts thus mean farmers are faced with both declining
production level and downside variability in production.
Income from livestock is weak to buffer income
Income from livestock is an important source of income among the sedentary farmers, but
more prominently among the pastoral population in the lowlands. Ability of livestock to buffer
crop income is much reduced in time of crop failure because periods of droughts are often marked
by poor pasture and water conditions, decline in livestock production (low birth, delay in maturity,
decreased milk production), worsened disease environment, and increased livestock loss through
death and distress sales. And reconstituting lost livestock is slow and costly under prevailing
conditions of increased periodicity of droughts and poorly functioning markets where prices tend
to rise rapidly in post-drought period.
Other income sources are thinning and risky
As the importance of income from crop and livestock declines, rural households move
towards other income sources. Among the pastoral population, for example, increasing numbers
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are shifting towards crop cultivation, trading (e.g. livestock and livestock products), renting
property, wage employment, and gathering and selling collected firewood and charcoal. However,
the possibilities for income expansion through these income sources are demand constrained
mainly because of the poor performance of the farm economy.
In addition, exposure to covariate risk looms large in the income sources. Income sources
such as trading beverages and food are linked to crop production, and hence positively co-vary
with crop income. Agricultural wage employment is marginally available in rural areas. More
people are moving to rural towns and market centers to settle and work in low-skilled casual wage
employment. However, wage employment is generally scarce because of strong link to agriculture
dominated local urban economy. Distant migration as an alternative source of wage income has
diminished in recent years because of constrained labor mobility related to the existing land reform
program (access to land is restricted to place of permanent residence) and formation of ethnic
regions (e.g. diminished incentive to migrate due to jurisdictional uncertainty).
Local markets are under continuous stress
Rural markets are poorly developed, as evident from their thinness and large swings in
prices under distress. Often, prices for food crops increase markedly in these markets while prices
of livestock, wages, and prices of collected or gathered products drop appreciably. Relative to
price of food crops, the terms of exchange in these markets thus move in ways that erode the real
purchasing power of sellers of assets (livestock in particular), labor and forest products. In other
words, returns from these sources (livestock, labor and forest products) are positively correlated
with crop income because of poor functioning of the markets under distress (for example, it is not
possible to compensate loss in crop income through sale of livestock since the return to livestock
falls in period of decline in crop production). Some of the markets disappear in some cases for lack
of effective demand.
Options for smoothing consumption are getting fewer
With income sources getting thinner and most of them co-varying positively with crop
production, farmers are increasingly left with fewer options to smooth consumption in times of
crop failures. There are also limits to lowered food consumption through rationing food
consumption such as adjusting diets to basic (or, cheap) food items and reducing frequency of
meals and serving.
Increased impoverishment
Despite the multiple strategies to stabilize income and consumption, some of the non-poor
households fall into poverty (the new poor). And those who are already poor experience deepening
poverty due to: (1) decline in income and asset level (from already low level), (2) diversification
into low-return income sources with increased exposure to drought risk, (3) constrained access to
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credit and social support network including complete exclusion, and (4) decrease in food
consumption and body adaptability to survive on low food intake.
The most vulnerable are the very poor (the destitute). These are households who are unable
to generate income and assets on account of lack of labor due to aging, poor health, and physical
incapacitation. Hence, they are heavily dependent on community support networks and/or relief
food aid. But, as the evidence from South Wello points, some of the support institutions fall apart
under prolonged food stress and increased impoverishment (Dessalegn Rahamato, 199; Yared et
al, 2000).
Conclusions
There are important long-term environmental changes; degradation of natural resources,
falling rainfall level accompanied with large variability, and rising temperature. Occurrence of
weather extremes such as droughts has increased over time notably in arid and semi-arid areas but
also extending to the most productive highlands of the country. The rural population living in
environmentally stressed areas are subjected to frequent and intense climate extremes, particularly
drought.
Although the rural households undertake deliberate actions (measures) to smooth income
and consumption, their capacity to prevent loss in their wellbeing has diminished over the years.
This is evident in the efficacy and outcomes of their risk management. First, the drive towards
diversifying to non-farm income sources has not been effective in compensating loss in farm
income sources because of their exposure to common environmental risk and reliance on local
markets under duress. Second, there are fewer instruments for households to mitigate and cope
with frequent droughts because of depletion of assets, erosion of forest resources, scarcity of longdistant employment, deterioration of social support networks, and constrained body adaptability
to survive on lowered food intake. Third, some households are engaging early in high-cost
strategies such as selling productive livestock whose opportunity cost in terms of future forgone
income is high. Finally, the increasingly vulnerability of the drought affected population to poverty
is a proof of diminishing capacity to effectively manage the risk. The least capable to manage risk
are households who live at the margin.
The prospect of impoverishment and hunger thus persists. The key development challenge
is to reduce both structural poverty and vulnerability to poverty. From a household perspective,
the challenge is enhancing the capacity of rural households to manage risk effectively. Improving
such capacity means, for example, reducing positive co-variation between income sources (e.g.
removing policy and legal constraints to long distance migration as a way to ease population
pressure on land and spread livelihood risk), reducing co-variation between income and assets (e.g.
prevent distress asset sales), and enhancing household consumption smoothing (e.g. through
targeted income transfer and/or productive employment). For such capacity to develop and sustain,
it is also crucial to enhance public response capability to monitor and intervene timely without
crowding out private effort.
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The Fall of American Soft Diplomacy in Ethiopia: A Victim of its own
Success17
Assefa Mehretu, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Abstract: Ethiopia’s soft diplomatic history with the United States goes back to
the dawn of the twentieth century when King Menelik in 1905 responded favorably
to the overtures by the United States for official relations between the two countries
when Ethiopia was the only independent country in Africa. The purpose of this
paper is to highlight the benchmarks of a successful engagement that had lasted for
over seventy years only to suffer reversals from critical events both internal and
external. A brief historical analysis will be rendered to highlight the role of the
United States in the modernization of Ethiopia and how that virtuous soft-power
diplomacy was destroyed by cold war calculations for détente with the Soviet
Union ignoring the geopolitical reality in the Horn that eventually spelled disaster
for Ethiopia. One of the friendliest official relations that the U.S. has had with an
African country in the twentieth century became a casualty when U.S. foreign
policy failed to match the challenges in the Horn of Africa in the early 1970s, giving
way to a brutal military regime aided and abated by some highly educated Marxists
many of whom went to school in some of the best institutions of higher learning in
the U.S. and Europe.
Introduction
The U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral relationship was about three-quarters of a century old when it
faced a major crisis in 1974 with the beleaguered Nixon's presidency by the Watergate scandal,
saw the overthrow of King of Kings Haile Sellassie by a military coup d'état even though the King
had visited the White House just months earlier. This was made worse by the unfortunate
preoccupation of Carter's White House a few years later in 1977 when it ignored Ethiopian plight
facing major geopolitical belligerence from Somalia backed by the Soviet Union. The rupture in
friendly relations between the U.S. government and Ethiopia's military junta known as Derg,
happened when the United States failed to honor the delivery of defensive military hardware to
Ethiopia with the excuse of the dubious so called Carter Doctrine of détente with the Soviets (Nye
2004). That was enough for the Derg to go to Moscow, declare Marxism and Leninism, and offer
Ethiopia’s government as an ideological client state of Soviet Union. This produced a strange play
in musical chairs in which the Soviets moved into Ethiopia, displacing the Americans who were
then considered an imperial power and an ideological adversary. The U.S. was asked by the Derg
regime in April of 1977 to scale down its presence in Ethiopia, close long-standing structures like
17
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the United States Information Service (USIS), the Military Advisory and Assistant Group
(MAAG), the Peace Corps and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
among others. To make matters look even more comical, the US moved into Somalia filling the
void left by its cold war antagonist.
That essentially ended three quarters of a century of friendly alliance for progress and
development between the U.S. and Ethiopia and began one of the most traumatic periods in
Ethiopia’s recent political, economic and institutional history.
When the U.S. and Ethiopia began interested in each other, neither country had much
knowledge of the other and nor has there been official contacts between the two countries until the
beginning of the 20th century. Ethiopian leaders were too preoccupied in defending the homeland
from European colonizers and unfriendly sultanates that they had little time to explore relations
with distant countries like the United States. Ethiopia was in the early stages of the “age of
princes” in which the country had descended into balkanized fiefdoms (Marcus 2002, 46-47;
Pankhurst 2001, 126-142) at the time of American independence. When the “age of princes” ended
in 1855, the U.S. was an isolationist and anti-colonial power with disdain for European powers so
much so that it proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to minimize European meddling in the
Americas (Mead 2002, 199-204). The two countries had to wait for half a century following the
end of the Civil War in 1865 for the U.S. and King Tewodros II’s consolidation of Ethiopia in
1855 for official overtures toward each other.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the impressive development outcomes that came
from over 70 years of friendship and alliance between the U.S. and Ethiopia and how most of those
outcomes, especially in the areas of human capital and institution building, were ruined by the
governments that followed the overthrow of the U.S. supported royal government in 1974. Three
years later, the nationalist Derg regime that rode the crest of a wave of dissatisfaction and anger at
the country’s poverty and food insecurity was itself coming under major challenge especially from
the ideological left that has been lurking behind the scenes for many years. The left saw a chance
to take state power by penetrating and steering the nationalist Derg. Unfortunately, for the radical
left in Ethiopia, many developments intersected at that critical time in the last 1970s. First, the left
was split into two factions, one siding with the Derg and other taking the adversarial option and
began to assassinate members of the radical left that joined the Derg. Second, belligerent and
Soviet backed Somalia began to engage Ethiopia’s forces along the border. Third, the conflict in
secessionist Eritrea began to enter a critical stage in its militancy. Fourth, the U.S. government,
using the unfortunate Carter Doctrine refused to support the Derg in its geopolitical challenges
especially with Somalia. Faced with these concatenated crises, the Derg first lashed out at the
opposition radical left by trying to eliminate its members with the “red terror” assassination
project. Following that brutal bloodletting in 1977 in Addis and other major cities, and embracing
the more pliant left that sided with it, it crafted a Marxist-Leninist discourse and declared Ethiopia
as a communist state declaring the Soviet Union as it ideological ally, asking the U.S. to scale
down its presence in Ethiopia.
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Early Ethiopian Contacts with Americans
Ethiopian-American early contacts have many interesting characteristics. First, they
started out as people-to-people contacts with little to no official imprimatur. Second, early
relations between the two countries featured many African Americans who were aware of and sang
praised for independent black Ethiopia. Third, Ethiopian-American official partnerships between
1903 and 1977 were based on the Wilsonian paradigm in the use of American soft-power “to attract
others by the legitimacy of (its) policies and the values that underlie them” (Nye 2004). Finally,
the lumpy Carter Doctrine which misread the seriousness of Ethiopia’s internal and external
challenges in 1970s, and the withholding of critical military support to the Derg regime between
1974 and 1977, let to the catastrophic collapse of the monarchy and the reformist military
nationalist government that followed it. That paved the way for a Soviet-backed Derg regime to
take power in 1977 and down-grade relations with the United States and ruin the many
accomplishments of its soft power that took 70 years to build (Metaferia 2009, 62-70; Jackson
2007, 4-5; Woodward 2003, 134-142). The paper is essentially a chronological account of
significant U.S.-led innovations in Ethiopia that resulted from the positive resolution of the dual
forces of Wilsonian soft-power idealism for growth and development as contrasted to Hamiltonian
hard-power realism for U.S. geopolitical expediency in the Horn of Africa (Nye 2004; Brzezinski
2012, 37-74; Jackson 2007, 19; Mead 2009, 99-173).
Ethiopia’s legendary international fame prior to 1970s dwarfs it shrunken and diminished
stature within or outside Africa. Its history has been told as one of the oldest civilizations in the
world with some of the most significant achievements of humankind. It played a prominent role
in world diplomacy as the only independent African state that continued to manage its own affairs
for millennia (Rubensson 1976, 1-5). It survived the colonial scramble of the 18th and 19th
centuries and served as in icon for black independence not only in Africa but also in the New
World. Africans under colonial occupation and those in the Diaspora made reference to its
significance as an ancient polity immortalized in the tales of ancient lands and the holy books of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam in which mention is made of the legendary Queen of Sheba who
ruled over large territories in two continents and had dealings with the ancient kingdoms of Egypt
and Israel over 3000 years ago (Marcus 2002, 17-19; Pankhurst 2001, 19; Gebrekidan 2005, 716). Africa and Ethiopia were interchangeable terns for ancient Greeks. Homer in the tenth
century BC described the people of Africa as “blameless Ethiopians” among whom the Greek gods
rested and feasted. Five centuries later, Herodotus, the father of History, paid similar accolades to
the wise Ethiopians (Perham 1969, 13-18; Pankhurst 2001, 18-19). Ethiopians controlled the
Meroetic and Axumite kingdoms of the pre and post Christian eras with their impressive artifacts
in evidence today (Marcus 2002, 8). It is the home of the only extant African script called Ethiopic
dating back to the pre-Axumite period of Ethiopia’s history (Harden 1926, 2-4; Gebrekidan 2005,
17-18).
Ethiopia is also one of the few countries which became one of the oldest cradles for the
development of the three great religions of the world: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. It was also
one of the ancient hearths for the development of sedentary agriculture and crop and animal
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domestication including coffee, teff, barley, cotton, dromedary, and donkey (Marcus 2002, 3; Stutz
and Warf 2005, 189). More recently, thanks to modern archeology, Ethiopia’s Rift Valley held
the remains of the first known and oldest hominid in the world (Pankhurst 2001, 1-9; Marcus 2002,
1-3).
The early relations between American and Ethiopians were characterized by truly peopleto-people relations with African Americans using independent and civilized Ethiopia as a source
of inspiration for progress and freedom of people of African descent in the new world (Gebrekidan
2005, 27-31; Alehegn 2008). As far back as 1865, Frederick Douglas declared that “arts,
appliances and the blessings of civilization flourished in …Ethiopia, at a time when all Europe
floundered in the depth of ignorance and barbarism” (quoted in Ayele 2003, 24). However we
may view Mr. Douglas’s observation, what is clear is how Ethiopia was idolized in the African
Diaspora. Ethiopia of course is known to African Americans well before that. In 1808, a mere 32
years following the American Declaration of Independence and a year before the birth of Abraham
Lincoln, Ethiopian merchants and African Americans in lower Manhattan made news when they
refused to sit in segregated pews and walked out from the First Baptist Church of New York and
established the first Abyssinian Baptist Church in New York to serve all Christians. The legendary
church later moved to Harlem and became one of the most renowned houses of worship committed
to struggles for freedom of African peoples and racial justice in the United States (ABC 2011;
Ayele 2003, 22; Gebrekidan 2005, 39-46; Chapelle 2011).
The Dawn of American Soft-Power Diplomacy with Ethiopia
King Menelik II of Ethiopia was known for his diplomatic skills in dealing with foreign
powers of his time. It came as no surprise when he decided to welcome the enthusiastic overtures
from the United States to send its first diplomatic mission to the Ethiopian court in 1903. Confident
of his international diplomatic stature as the victor over an invading European colonial power when
he defeated Italy in Adwa in 1896, and having succeeded in his dealings with the two most
powerful colonial powers of the time by achieving the Franco-Ethiopian and Anglo-Ethiopian
diplomatic settlements in 1897 which ended European threats against Ethiopia’s sovereignty
(Marcus 1995, 174-185; Marcus 2002, 103; Pankhurst 2001, 194), his bold diplomatic reach to
the New World was a logical outcome of his legendary foresight. What was interesting about
Menelik's diplomatic initiative with the Americans did not start with bilateral links between the
two countries. It began in 1897 with the persistence of a Haitian intellectual Benito Sylvain when
he met King Menelik and suggested that Ethiopia and Haiti have diplomatic relations.
He was not successful but two years later his deep interest in the matter gave rise to an
African American Texan cotton farmer and later a Wall Street stock broker, William H. Ellis who,
after having visited Ethiopia in 1899 to start a business, was so impressed with Menelik that he
proposed a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States. This led to another
disappointment when American authorities did not take William Ellis seriously. This led to
another individual by the name of Robert Skinner (Skinner 1906; Gebrekidan 2005, 39-41; Marcus
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1995, 198-200), who was America’s Council General in Marseilles, France, and who shared
Sylvain’s and Ellis’s enthusiasm for Ethiopia and the court of Menilik (Ayele 2003, 41-56).
Skinner persisted through three years of correspondence with the State Department until he secured
the sympathetic hearing from Presidents McKinley and later Theodore Roosevelt, to be appointed
Commissioner and lead a mission to Ethiopia in 1903 (Skinner 1906; Metaferia 2009, 13-23; Ayele
2003, 45-56).
Skinner's arrival in Addis Ababa in December 1903, marked the first time that Americans
visited the Ethiopian state and its legendary leader Menelik II. It was a benchmark achievement
for all those early advocates like Silvain, Ellis and Skinner, to advance Ethiopian-American
relations. Menelik's signature of the “Treaty of Amity, Reciprocal Establishments and
Commerce", which was later ratified by the U.S. Senate and signed by President Roosevelt in
1904, became the cornerstone for a long and fruitful friendship between Ethiopia and the United
States (Skinnier 1906, 73-82; Zewde 2001, 184; Metaferia 2009, 19).
William Ellis, who
persisted to play a role in the friendship agreements between the two countries was once again
passed over when the U.S. State Department chose a certain Kent J. Loomis, brother of then
Assistant Secretary of State, to take the signed treaty to Ethiopia. But Ellis was asked to
accompany Loomis. As fate had it, Loomis died at sea and Ellis ended up delivering the ratified
Treaty to Menelik (Ayele 2003, 55-56; Metaferia 2009, 19).
Menelik's increasing diplomatic stature in the international scene as well as the feeling
among Americans that Ethiopia was an African “El Dorado” was enhanced when President
Theodore Roosevelt invited the Ethiopian King to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Lewis
in 1904 (Skinner 1906, 79). Although Menelik was unable to make the trip to the United States,
the invitation was considered a significant gesture of amity and respect for Ethiopia and the King
especially. The words of the invitation were engraved in the middle of a large handsome silver
salver from Governor Francis of Missouri, President of the Exposition (Skinner 1906, 79).
Menelik's voracious appetite for technology and infrastructure enabled him to overlook colonial
European reservations on an African country reaching out for an American friendship. Menelik
told Skinner that the typewriter he brought as a gift was received with gratitude but it was useless
to him if it did not type the Amharic alphabet (Skinner 1906, 119-120). Menelik got his Amharic
typewriter in 1908 thanks to an Ethiopian engineer and Italians at Oliveti.
Menelik's appetite for modern machines were evident later in him learning how to ride a
bike and later received one of the early Ford Model Ts (now at the Addis Ababa University
Museum) and became the first Ethiopian King to drive an automobile. He was interested in
photography, trains, weapons and communication systems. He had the French build the first and
only railway link between Addis Ababa and the port city of Djibouti. He also had Ethiopia
connected to the rest of the world by joining the International Postal Union in 1908, and soon after,
he saw the installation of telegraph and telephone systems (Marcus 1995, 75-213).
The U.S. mission in Ethiopia was closed upon Menelik’s death in 1913 and remained
closed during the first term of Woodrow Wilson’s administration (Metaferia 2009, 20). During
World War I and the Great Depression, U.S.-Ethiopian relations remained in hiatus. During the
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same period, Ethiopia was also going through a transitional turmoil with many royal personalities
jockeying for the throne following Menelik’s death. Menelik’s youngest grandson, Lij Iyasu,
became the head of state in 1913 before court intrigues for succession were fully settled. But this
led to a coup d’état in 1916 with Menelik’s daughter installed in the Solomonic throne as Queen
Zewditu with Ras Teferi (later King of Kings Haile Sellasie I) as regent. When Queen Zewditu
died in 1930, Ras Teferi was crowned King of Kings bringing an end to almost two decades of
unrelenting power struggle within the Ethiopian aristocracy (Marcus 2002, 116-129; Pankhurst
2001, 200-218; Zewde 2001, 114-148).
World War II and its Aftermath for Ethiopia
King Haile Sellassie followed Menelik's lead in the modernization of Ethiopia with
deliberate focus and determination. However, his country faced an unexpected challenge when
fascist Italy, as an Axis Power under Benito Mussolini, revived its colonial ambitions that Menelik
thwarted in 1896. Even though, Ethiopia was a signatory of the League of Nations, the only
African country to do so when it joined the organization on September 28, 1923, neither the U.S.
(which was not a member of the League) or the League itself could save Ethiopia from being
invaded by an Axis power of World War II. Ironically, President Woodrow Wilson, who got the
1919 Novel Peace Price for his innovative international alliance for collective security, failed in
1920 to have the League of Nations ratified by the U.S. congress (Ayele 2003, 78; Zewde 2001,
131; Perham 1969, 224-225). The Europeans, who hailed its principles, were soon to witness its
disastrous failure to uphold its key covenant of collective security and witness Axis powers of
Germany, Italy and Japan launch their unjust wars against sovereign nations in Europe, Africa and
Asia. Ethiopia was one of the victims. Strangely, the U.S. claimed neutrality in the face of a clear
violation by Italy of the international law (Marcus 2002, 138-141; Metaferia 2009, 35-38). King
Haile Sellassie went into exile when fascist Italy used weapons of mass destruction and massacred
Ethiopian fighters with mustard gas.
He then showed up at the League's headquarters in Geneva, draped in black cape over his
traditional garment, stood at the podium on June 30, 1936 (heckled by fascist sympathizers in the
galleries) and offered his historic admonition (consistent with Wilson’s ideals) with eloquence and
grace, on the failure of the League of Nations to live up to its covenant and protect his country
from a rogue regime invading his sovereign country (Pankhurst 2001, 236-238). In his indictment
of the League for its embarrassing appeasement of an axis power (in its veiled endorsement of a
colonial occupation), he concluded his speech with the prophetic words that rang throughout the
world: “It is us today, it will be you tomorrow …. God and history shall remember your judgment”
(Ayele 2003, 137-139; Pankhurst 2001, 236-238). As the only African leader that was able to
stand up to those anachronistic colonialists of the time, Time Magazine honored the King by
naming him Man of the Year in January 1936, and his stand became an indelible market for all
people who yearned for liberty and justice (Marcus 2002, 141-146).
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What is most striking was that the United States government not only prevaricated about
Ethiopia’s plight for material assistance to defend itself from fascist Italy (Gebrekidan 2005, 4958; Ayele 2003, 85-100; Metaferia 2009, 35-38), but also it cleared the way for fascist forces to
enter the city of Addis Ababa by closing its embassy with a message to Benito Mussolini to occupy
Addis Ababa immediately to avert chaos (Metaferia 2009, 35). This was a historic disappointment
for Americans of African origin who have been called to action by luminaries like Langston
Hughes who composed the poem “Call of Ethiopia” (Hughes 1935) to bemoan that the loss of
Ethiopia’s independence was regarded as the loss of an icon of black power in general (Scott 1978).
African Americans mobilized their ranks in solidarity with Ethiopia with Harlem and Washington
D.C. serving as hubs of pro-Ethiopian agitation that spanned from Texas to New York. Many
were willing to go to Ethiopia to fight the Italian invaders (Metaferia 2009, 35-38). A panAfricanist Ethiopian by the name of Dr. Melaku Beyan campaigned on his country's behalf to
mobilize American help for his native land (Pankhurst 2001, 238; Scott 1978; Gebrekidan 2005,
98-104). Mississippi-born John C. Robinson, known as the Brown Condor and Father of the
Tuskegee Airmen, who volunteered to fight for Ethiopia and arrived in Addis Ababa in 1935, was
one of Beya's recruits.
Ethiopia’s Alliance Formation after WW II
Ethiopians did not forget what happened to their independence and the ultimate sacrifice
their heroic fighters paid when the foundational covenant of the League of Nations was left in
tatters with the appeasement of Italian fascists to occupy Ethiopia. They also knew that they owed
a debt of gratitude to the victorious Americans and their European allies to put an end to Nazism
and fascism in Europe and liberate occupied territories like Ethiopia.
King Haile Sellasie’s victorious arrival in Gojjam on Jan 20, 1941 and then in Addis Ababa
on May 5, 1941, marked the beginning of the golden era of Ethiopian-American partnership for
progress and development which initially targeted the advancement of education. Kind Haile
Sellassie began his modernization campaign with two significant changes upon independence.
First, in 1941 Haile Sellasie (HSI) altered the parity between French and English in Ethiopia’s
schools in favor of English. There was also a major change in men’s fashion. The King and most
of his entourage went into exile still wearing the Ethiopian traditional garment sometimes covered
under a black cape. Upon his triumphant return, the King wore a British general’s uniform. Soon
after, many male government employees also began to wear more widely “western” style outfits
with soof (wool) jackets, bolale soori (western pants with wide cuffs) (often with a kuta (white
cotton toga) over the jacket), neck ties, and fedoras. Some male fashions were also accessorized
with riding pants (known as Teferi soori), riding boots, black umbrellas and walking canes. During
the post-war recovery and reconstruction, Americans became a more favored partner to help drive
Ethiopia’s modernization (Zewde 2001, 179-189). This was made vivid when, Haile Sellasie, still
in the “shadow of Britain” following the war’s end (Spencer 1984, 141-144; Marcus 2002, 152154; Vestal 2011, 33-39; Pankhurst 2001, 251-256), made it known that he wanted to meet
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Vestal 2011, 36) while FDR was at the Yalta Conference in 1945.
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HSI was flown to Cairo with the blessing of the American envoy to Ethiopia to meet Roosevelt on
his ship USS Quincy anchored in the Great Bitter Lake off the Egyptian Red Sea coast. The
successful meeting with FDR opened the door for friendly relations between the two countries for
over four decades. FDR invited the HSI to visit the United States which the King accepted (Marcus
2002, 156). In a smart diplomatic move, HSI also met Winston Churchill in a quickly arranged
meeting with the Prime Minister in Cairo as a show of goodwill and respect that Ethiopia had for
U.K. even as it sought American involvement in its modernization efforts (Vestal 2011, 36-37;
Pankhurst 2001, 256-260).
FDR death caused the postponement of HSI’s planned visit to the U.S. until 1954, when
Truman, upon winning his own new term as President in 1949, had launched, in his inaugural
address, his "Point Four" program for international development with particular focus on the Third
World to "help the people" of Asia and Africa to "learn the methods of our science and our industry
and use these methods to develop their own resources” (McVety 2008). Haile Sellassie could not
have made his first visit of the U.S. at a better time and he could not have been more pleased with
Truman's focus, as it was exactly in line with his thinking about U.S. involvement in the
modernization of Ethiopia (see also Metaferia 2009, 40-41; Vestal 2011, 35-37; Zewde 2001, 184).
As Negussay Ayele observed, “relations between the
United States and Ethiopia entered a new marathon era in the second decade of the
twentieth century” with Haile Sellassie outlasting the terms of U.S. Presidents from Woodrow
Wilson to Richard Nixon (Ayele 2003, 61), but his 1954 American visit was the first and most
important to cement American involvement in the modernization of Ethiopia.
Improving Ethiopia’s Agriculture
Ethiopia is one of the oldest hearths of agricultural domestication. However, the country's
agricultural sector remained traditional, small-holder, and low-technology enterprise. Haile
Sellasie realized this early in his post-war modernization plans. He also knew that the Americans
were highly advanced in agrarian innovations. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the most
remarkable feature of the initial thrust of the Ethiopian-American partnership for progress was
based on “low modernist” and soft-power ideals of the Point Four program (McVety 2008, 387).
Haile Sellassie first step toward this was to invite Henry G. Bennett, the then President of
Oklahoma A&M (now Oklahoma State University) to visit Ethiopia to discuss the institutional
needs to improve Ethiopia’s agriculture. Bennett visited Ethiopia in April 1950, a year after
Truman gave his inaugural speech on Point Four on January 20, 1949 (Vestal 2011, 35-37; OSU
1969, 4). Bennett and Haile Sellasie became friends, and Bennet had tremendous confidence in
the progressive monarch and did his best to help Ethiopia's agriculture as President of Oklahoma
A&M and later as Truman’s Assistant Secretary of State and head of the Point Four program.
Ethiopian and American government representatives signed the “Point Four Agreement for
Technical Cooperation” in 1951. The objective of the agreement was “to cooperate with each
other in the interchange of technical knowledge and skills and related activities designed to
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contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive
capacities of Ethiopia” (quoted by McVety 2008, 383-388).
U.S. and Ethiopian signed the first project agreement under the Point Four program in 1952
to build the College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts in Alemaya (now renamed Haramaya
University) with academic and technical assistance from Oklahoma A&M (now Oklahoma State
University) in Stillwater (Vestal 2011, 3-39; McVety 2008, 387-388). The objectives were to
transform Ethiopia into the breadbasket of the region and to “building up Ethiopia’s major
potential contribution to the economic strength of the free nations of the world” (McVety 2008,
387). There was so much confidence in Ethiopia's abilities and tremendous enthusiasm on all sides
that both the Americans and their Ethiopian counterparts did not want to wait until buildings for
the college were constructed in Alemaya. They launched the educational program and began to
hold college classes in 1952 at the Jimma Agricultural Technical School which had been
established in 1947 (Bechere c2008, 3).
When the new campus was ready in Harer in 1958, Jimma and a similar institution in Ambo
had already become exemplary community-based agricultural technological schools in Ethiopia
since their inception in 1947 (OSU 1969).
By 1974, when the Derg came to power and caused a massive brain drain, Alemaya College
of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts (now Haramaya University) had become one of the most
successful of HSI’s innovations resulting from the first Ethiopian-American academic partnership
for progress and modernization (Shinn 2002; Metaferia 2009, 56). Alemaya had produced
hundreds of scientists that not only contributed to the growth the older agricultural schools in
Jimma and Ambo but also triggered the mushrooming of new colleges and research institutes all
over the country including the first research institute of the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural
Research (IAR) established in Holeta in 1963 to improve yields in highland crops, vegetables and
dairy products (Bechere c2008). Other IARs were to follow in Nazreth (Adama), Jimma, Debre
Zeit (Bishoftu), Bako, Melka Werer, Ambo, Kulumsa and Pawe (see also Bechere c2008, 4).
The 1952 agreement between the U.S. and Ethiopia was a remarkable success. In 1952,
there were no Ethiopian graduates in the agricultural sciences. By the mid-80s, Haremaya had
issued over 1600 diplomas, 2500 B.S. degrees and over 80 M.S. degrees. In 1970s and 80s, there
were hundreds of them working as deans of faculty, directors of IARs and college faculty,
agronomists, soil scientists, crop breeders, extension agents, and scientists in many international
agricultural research organizations like CYMMIT, ILCA and others. They also came from the
most prestigious schools of agriculture in the US including Oklahoma State, Cornel, Michigan
State, Illinois, Iowa, UC Davis, Ohio State, Purdue, Indiana, Minnesota and many others. There
were over 50 PhD holders in the agricultural sciences. Gebisa Ejeta, an internationally known
sorghum breeder and Professor of Agriculture at Purdue, who won the World Food Prize and the
National Hero Award, Ethiopia’s highest honor, is among some of the most distinguished alumni
of the Alemaya College of Agriculture (ILRI 2009).
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American Contributions to Ethiopia’s Educational System
In 1952, U.S. and Ethiopia entered another agreement. That agreement was to help “the
Ministry of Education in developing a modern educational program and school system adapted to
the needs of Ethiopia” (McVety 2008, 389; see also Metaferia 2009, 55-57). The agreement
included instituting teacher education, improving school equipment and provision of books. King
Haile Sellassie held the portfolio for Minister of Education until the late 1960s demonstrating his
strong commitment to education. In the 1950s, most modern schools in Ethiopia were dominated
by the British, Canadian and French nationals and they were concentrated in Addis Ababa.
Americans had little to no visibility in educational establishments until the 1952 Point Four
agreement which led to the establishment of the largest day school in Addis Ababa known as Haile
Sellassie I (Kokebe Tsibah) Day School in Kebena with an American Director, the famous Dr.
Perry Carmichael, perhaps the first American PhD school principal hired by the Ethiopian Ministry
of Education. Perry Carmichael who directed the school for over ten years was also an Oklahoman
as Henry G. Bennett, the Oklahoma A&M University President, who helped found Alemaya, was.
Perry Carmichael and a few American teachers, a few also from Oklahoma, fashioned the new day
school along American lines with classroom facilities, labs, and campus environment complete
with play grounds, a theatre and a school band. Unlike the elite Wingate and Teferi Makonnen
schools, the HSI Day School was the first major public school for the common folk and
coeducational from the start. It had the largest enrollment in both elementary and high school
grades. It also served American families in Addis Ababa before the American Community School
(now called the International Community School) opened in 1966.
Beginning in the 1950s, American system of higher education in Ethiopia went beyond
agriculture and proceeded to influence arts and letters, social science, law, business, medical
sciences, and engineering sciences. When King Haile Sellassie founded the University College of
Addis Ababa (UCAA) in 1950 at Arat Kilo, it was modeled after British university colleges,
although it was headed and mostly staffed by Canadian Jesuits. The late 1950s and early 1960s
brought many changes in Ethiopia’s higher education that intensified American involvement.
UCAA was elevated to a university status in 1962, and renamed Haile Sellassie I University with
a new campus on the former palace grounds donated by Haile Sellasie himself. More American
faculty and administrators began to arrive through a variety of programs including the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), the successor of the Point Four program, and the
Fulbright scholars program, another vital instrument in the arsenal of America’s soft-power. An
outstanding contribution of American soft-power was the education of Ethiopia's high-level human
power. The scholarships made available through the USAID, USIS, Fulbright and private donors
like Ford and Rockefeller, supported numerous graduates from Ethiopian colleges to attend
graduate schools in some of the elite universities in the U.S.
The first law school opened in 1963 and its was led a Dean from Rutgers University (who
later in 1968 became Vice President of Haile Sellassie I University, the first American to attain
that position). In the same year, another American headed the establishment of the first College
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of Business Administration (CBA). A few years later, the USAID funded the building of the
Kennedy Library. The USAID also contributed to the establishment the first development research
institute called the Institute of Development Research (IDR) which opened in 1972.
With initial funds coming from the USAID, Rockefeller and Ford Foundation, an American
Professor Robert West, Professor of Economics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, became
the Interim Director and established what had become a very productive social science research
organ, now renamed Institute of Development and Policy Research (IDPR). All of these were
made part of the Haile Sellassie University.
Ethiopia also became one of the beneficiaries of the Peace Corps, perhaps one of the best
institutions of American soft-power. The first contingent of Peace Corps Volunteers, 279 strong,
arrived in Addis Ababa in September 1962 and were placed in teaching positions throughout the
country. By the time Peace Corps Ethiopia had to close in 1977 because of the Derg's sudden antiAmerican indiscretion, over 3,000 volunteers had served in Ethiopia (PC 2009; Metaferia 2009,
56-57). The United States Information Service/Agency (USIS/USIA) (which became defunct in
1999), was another American institution of soft-power (albeit with some propagandist undertones)
that played a vital role in the 1960s and 1970s in demonstrating American politics, culture and
material life as an inspiration for young Ethiopians with its well-stocked library and comfortable
reading rooms to which Ethiopian students had access including borrowing privileges. A variety
of films and audiovisual equipment were made available by USIS to schools to show films of
educational and cultural content in their classrooms. The USIS also published a Newsletter that
was distributed free to high school students in in Addis Ababa. It anchored a variety of programs
for cultural exchanges in which American academics and persons of fine arts came to address
Ethiopian students. Some of these programs sponsored Ethiopian teachers and students to travel
to the United States for short term visits of schools and cultural establishments. Perhaps more
importantly, the USIS played an important role in administering U.S. scholarships funded by the
U.S. government as well as private donors. It also administered standardized tests for entrance by
Ethiopian graduates into U.S. colleges and universities for graduate training.
American Role in Ethiopia’s Infrastructure
Another laudable innovation of American soft-power diplomacy was the establishment the
Ethiopian Air Lines (EAL) in 1945. This is without a doubt one of the most resilient
establishments that the Americans helped modernize. Its success had two major reasons. The first
was that Ethiopia has had a small but well-functioning Ethiopian Air Force (see below) fifteen
years before the establishment of EAL. It had produced many Ethiopian aviators and aircraft
engineers. The second reasons was that Ethiopia established a joint venture with the American
Trans World Airlines (TWA), which was then a premier international airline, to assemble the
necessary facilities and training to run the fledgling EAF (Vestal 2011, 37-38; Marcus 2002, 159;
Zewde 2001, 186-187). EAF began flight service in 1946 using American built five C-47 (or DC3s) Skytrains purchased from U.S. military surplus.
70

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad

DC-3s were EAL’s work-horse for domestic flights until the 1980s. American made
Convair aircraft came into service with a pressurized cabin and a more comfortable ride to
international destinations (Ethiopian 2011). With the purchase of Boeing 720B and the completion
of the more modern Bole Airport in 1962, EAL (which later became called simply as “Ethiopian”)
entered the jet age in 1963. By early 1970s, Ethiopian had become one of the successful and
popular airlines in Africa. In 1971 EAL hired its first Ethiopian General Manager, why which
time most of the EAF flight crew and ground personnel had been Ethiopianized. The TWA link
ended in 1977 and Ethiopian became self-sufficient in aircraft maintenance not only for itself but
also for several airlines in the region (Metaferia 2009, 57-58). Ethiopian is one of the best
examples of an institution that had a strong indigenous base which flourished when it came in
contact with an American partner with skills in technology and management to run a modern and
technologically sophisticated establishment. Another factor that helped Ethiopian survive the
ruinous Derg, that similar modern institutions like the commercial bank system, insurance
companies, the highway and power authorities, and higher education establishments were not
lucky to have had, was it was left alone with its autonomy with little to no interference from the
communist and tribalist apparatchiks and cadres.
In the 1970s, it became the first African airline to fly to many African capitals, European
cities (Athens, Rome, Madrid), and East Asian capitals (including Mumbai, Bangkok and Beijing).
It operates Boeing 737s, 757s, 767s and 777s, 787s, Airbos A350placed orders for the Boeing
Dreamliner and Airbus A350-900s. Ethiopian has joined the S-900s. Its reputation as a reliable
and successful international airline with a geographic scope that spans the world, it has become a
member of the Star Alliance in 2010 with a direct service to New York and DC from Addis
(Ethiopian 2011).
U.S.-Ethiopian partnership in aviation had other very important spinoffs. One of them was
the establishment of the Ethiopian-U.S. Mapping Mission in 1963 whose objective for the U.S.
Government to supply the Government of Ethiopian with up-to-date maps and photogrammetric
technologies. About a thousand U.S. military personnel came to Ethiopia to work with their
Ethiopian counterparts up until its closure in 1970 with the completion of the topographic survey
of all of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Mapping and Geography Institute served as the Ethiopian
counterpart to the U.S. Mapping Mission and later became the custodian of the maps,
photogrammetric and cartographic expertise of the country. The Ethiopian Mapping Institute (now
renamed Ethiopian Mapping Authority) was again an example of a very successful collaboration
between the two countries in which a critical innovation of mapping and cadastral service became
part of the cluster of very advanced institutions that were to serve the launching of Ethiopia into a
modern state for purposes ranging from the defense of the homeland to highway construction
(Savage 1973; UN 1964, 1).
Another significant U.S.-Ethiopian partnership was to build Ethiopia's highways. As a
mountainous country with little to no navigable waters, Ethiopians lived in isolated villages many
of which were not connected to a national highways system. The establishment of the Imperial
Highway Authority (IHA) in 1951 was meant to solve that problem of inaccessibility. The
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occupying force of Italians had built about 7,000 kilometers of roads, half of them paved with
asphalt, to secure what they hoped was going to be their colony. After independence, Ethiopia did
not have the knowhow, human power or funds to maintain and add to what Italians left behind.
American assistance to meet this challenge came also in 1951 with technical assistance from the
United States Bureau of Public Roads headed by soon to be famous American, John Humbard:
(Master Road Builder) with a loan of $9,000,000 from the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), now the World Bank. The loan was backed by the U.S. government.
IHA embarked on improving the rapidly crumbling Italian built roads and launched an impressive
road building program to connect the various provincial capitals and much of the remote
hinterlands of Ethiopia from which came most of the cash crops shipped to Addis Ababa and then
to the ports of Assab and Massawa (before Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia). Just as the other
examples of American assisted innovations like the Ethiopian Airlines and Ethiopian Mapping
Institute , IHA was recognized as one of Haile Sellassie best run modern establishments patterned
along American styles of management and staffed by some of most competent Ethiopian and
American engineers and planners (Zewde 2001, 187-188; Metaferia 2009, 58).
Americans and the Ethiopian Military
Although America's investment in Ethiopia's modernization and development was most
remarkable in building institutions for high-level human power and strategi infrastructure, it also
helped Ethiopia modernize its defense forces beginning in the 1940s. Military cooperation
between the two countries had its origin in King Haile Sellassie being highly interested in building
an Ethiopian air force. He cannot forget how much difference that made in Italy's defeat of
Ethiopia when fascists rained bombs and poison gas from the air in which Ethiopian fighting
forces, lacking air power, could not defend themselves. His interest in planes was so keen that
Haile Sellassie requested the staging of an air show at his coronation in 1930. American Hubert
Fauntleroy Julian, the “Black Eagle of Harlem” (also known as the “Negro Lindbergh at the time),
was invited to fly during the coronation ceremonies (Shaftel 2009; Ayele 2003, 115-116). Julian
first parachuted on the ceremonial grounds from one of the French piloted planes and then flew
one of the biplanes (Ayele 2003, 115). HSI was so impressed with the demonstration that he
decided to build an air force, a decision that was one of his foundational initiatives that not only
led to creation of the Ethiopian air force but an entire modern innovation in Ethiopian aviation
which had both military and civilian implications.
The Ethiopian Air Force remained small and of insignificant fighting force until 1947 when
Haile Sellassie asked Sweden to help in building the Ethiopian Air Force in Bishoftu, about 30
miles south of Addis Ababa. A Swedish General took commanded of the Ethiopian Air Force with
20 Saab aircraft, most of which were trainers. The Swedes were successful in training many
Ethiopian pilots and aircraft mechanics. However, significant combat capability followed only
after 1953 when the United States-Ethiopian Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement made it
possible for Ethiopia to acquire B-17A light bombers, F-86 and F-5 jet fighters and C-47 transport
from the 1950s to 70s (Metaferia 2009, 58). In 1962, the command of the Ethiopian Air Force
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was transferred from the Swedes with an Ethiopian Brigadier General taking full command with a
compliment of senior and junior officers. At the time, all of the air force's planes were flown and
maintained by an all-Ethiopian team. Until Ethiopia changed alliances and went to the Soviet
Union in 1977, the Ethiopian Air Force was one of the best success stories in Ethiopia’s
modernization for which Ethiopian-Swedish and Ethiopian-American partnerships were primarily
responsible.
Ethiopia remained an American ally during the Cold War and played a significant role at
the time to safeguard U.S.’s geostrategic interests (Zewde 2001, 185-186). The modernization of
the Ethiopian Air Force coincided with the introduction of American equipment and technology
to also upgrade the other armed forces of the time, the elite royal body guard, the army, and the
navy. Ethiopian-American partnership in military affairs began the initial investment by Roosevelt
in 1943 to modernize Ethiopia’s military through the American lend-lease program (Zewde 2001,
184-186; Ayele 2003, 170). That investment paid off handsomely with Korean War (1950-53)
when Ethiopia became the only African country to stand with the U.S and other UN combatants
against the Chinese and North Koreans. Ethiopia sent to Korea over 3,000 from the elite Ethiopian
Royal Body Guard to fight alongside the American 7th Infantry Division (Marcus 2002, 159;
Metaferia 2009, 4). The year the Korean War ended in 1953, Ethiopia and the United States
entered into two major military cooperative regimes. The first was the establishment of the
Kagnew Communication Station in Asmara, Eritrea (which at the time was a federal province of
Ethiopia). Kagnew Station was the largest radio communication and monitoring stations in the
world which the U.S. used to monitor Soviet radio communication in the region (Vestal 2011, 4042; Zewde 2001, 184-186; Metaferia 2009, 49-50). Kagnew Station had over 4,000 American
military personnel in Asmara alone. In 1953, Ethiopia and the United States signed Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement which was operationalized by the establishment in Addis Ababa
of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). MAAG reached its peak in the 1960s with
over 300 American military personnel with technical and financial assistance to train tens of
thousands of Ethiopian soldiers (Zewde 2001, 186).
Another innovation by Haile Sellassie that was later supported by American equipment
was the Royal Ethiopian Navy which was established in 1956 in Massawa with Norwegians and
the British responsible for training naval officers whereas the United States supplied the equipment
including several coast guard cutters, torpedo boats, and a frigate-type seaplane tender.
King Haile Sellasie's last military innovation was the establishment of a Sandhust-style
Military Academy in 1957 to train the office corps for the growing Ethiopian army. Indian Prime
Minister, Jawaharlal Panditru and King Haile Sellassie came to an agreement for the Indian army
to train the future elite officers the Ethiopian army (Zewde 2001, 186). Within a few years of its
creation, Americans, which were not involved in the Military Academy later extended American
advanced training for some of the top graduates to pursue advanced training in U.S. military
academies and installations. Some furthered their studies in military affairs and others studied law
and other subjects in Ethiopia and the U.S. and assumed high leadership positions in the defense
and ministerial establishments of Ethiopia.
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The U.S. continued to honor its role in modernization of the Ethiopian armed forces with
a promise to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to upgrade the military equipment including the
delivery of a squadron of F-5 fighters in 1975. However, relations began to sour quickly when the
U.S. refused to meet requests from the Derg for U.S. to deliver military hardware both purchased
and donated. The U.S. reluctance was based on two things. First, it was pushing detente with the
Soviets and did not want to change the balance of power in the Horn with belligerent Somalia
which at the time was an ally of the communist power. The second reasons was that the U.S. was
concerned about the human-rights abuses with imprisonment and extrajudicial killings by the Derg
following the overthrow of the royal regime in 1974 (Korn 1986, 7-9; Metaferia 2009, 62-70).
The Demise of American Soft-Power in Ethiopia
Unfortunately for Ethiopia, the 1970s saw an intersection of many developments some of
which spelled dire consequences for the modernizing forces that Americans helped build. The
problems that contributed to the disruption had both Ethiopian and American origins. The
Ethiopian problems had to do with the concatenated challenges in the mid-1970s which started out
with the mid-East oil embargo of 1973-74 which raised petroleum prices and triggered taxi strikes
in Addis Ababa which were then followed by other work stoppages, student unrest, and a mutiny
in the armed forces (Marcus 2002, 181-201). There was also the 1973 famine in Wollo which was
grossly mishandled by the government and manipulated by the disloyal opposition for political
ends. On top of that, Somalia’s military build-up with Soviet help in the early-70s prior to the fullscale Ogaden War of 1977, had become a serious concern for the Ethiopian ground forces deployed
along the border between the two countries.
Faced with these challenges that came at the same time and unable to resolve them quickly,
HSI’s government collapsed in 1974 (Marcus 2002, 181-189; Metaferia 2009, 61-65). The
creeping coup d’état that was pulled into the power vacuum soon evolved into a brutal Marxist
regime that spelled disaster to the entire country and caused a major setback for American
modernizing soft-power diplomacy in Ethiopia. The Derg regime, especially following the Red
Terror that began in 1977, caused a drastic reversal in the modernization process as thousands of
highly trained Ethiopians lost their lives, were intimidated into silence, were co-opted, fled the
country, and those abroad for studies failed to return home afraid of the human rights abuses and
extrajudicial killings (Shinn 2002; Metaferia 2009, 59-60, 62-65; Zewde 2001, 236-239).
However, the Derg was not alone on the Ethiopian side in undermining the EthiopianAmerican partnership for progress and modernization. Ironically, the very success of HSI’s
modernization efforts especially in education was the source of much of the problems the
monarchy faced in the 1960s and 1970s. At this juncture, it may be important to point out the
remarkable achievements in education and human capital development that occurred as part of
HSI’s modernization process as follows: (a) the high quality of tertiary institutions in social
science, arts and letters and the hard sciences that matched their peers in Europe and the United
States in the quality of students they produced, (b) the number of Ethiopians placed and trained in
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some of the best schools in the United States and Europe, (c) the high rate of returnees of
Ethiopians after completing their training overseas some of whom began to pose serious challenges
to the legitimacy of the royal regime, and (d) the fast pace of Ethiopianization of key positions in
critical establishments that were staffed by foreign nationals. The overall success of the
modernization process was evidenced by the fact that in just over 25 years from the establishment
of the first University College of Addis Ababa in 1950, almost all of the institutions of higher
learning and most of the key modern establishments like the cabinet ministries, armed forces,
banks, insurance companies, airlines, power plants, communication establishments, the highways
system, water resources, and corporate headquarters were almost entirely staffed by Ethiopian
graduates.
However, the outcomes of the Ethiopian-American partnership and the modernization
efforts by HSI’s government were not always assessed in positive terms. According to some of
the elite, HSI’s modernization efforts were a ruse to cement the colonial empire-state launched by
Menilik II and sustain Ethiopia as a “prison of nationalities” (Holcomb and Ibssa 1990, 235-258;
Gebremedhin 1989, 2-36; Jalata 2005, 105-125; Iyob 1995, 41-46). For others, it was an
instrumentalist subterfuge for HSI “to reconstruct feudalism on a new and advanced basis” (Zewde
2001, 140; Tareke 1996, 42-54). And still others considered that HSI, despite his undemocratic
ways, was an authentic modernizer who “viewed himself as a model for other African nations
struggling to break free of their European oppressors” (McVety 2008, 393; see also Pankhurst
2001, 208-218, 256-265; Marcus 2002, 130-180; Zewde 2002, 20-34; Ambachew 2009, 18-33;
Metaferia 2009, 45-60; Gebrekidan 2005, 20-23). HSI went against the advice of many of his
contemporary royal and aristocratic families and proceeded with the modernization track
especially in educating children from ordinary backgrounds (Zewde 2002, 24-34; Clapham 1969,
49-51; Ambatchew 2009, 18-20). He pleaded with parents in the countryside to send their children
to schools in Addis Ababa, personally assuring them of their wellbeing and safety (Ambatchew
2009, 25-30). There was a whole set of incentives ranging from boarding privileges, uniforms,
Christmas-day treats and gifts to every student in Addis Ababa, gifts of books, gold watches,
fountain pens, and other gifts he personally handed out to students who excelled in their studies,
and college uniforms of suits and ties and fancy woven badges on blazers that matched those of
Cambridge and Oxford (Ambatchew 2009, 20-21). In this regard, it is also remarkable to note that
his initial focus on tertiary education was the establishment of the first liberal University College
of Addis Ababa (UCAA) in 1950. This was the very establishment that incubated some of his
worst detractors that cried “feudalism” ad infinitum and did more to undermine his authority than
anything else in the 1960s and 1970s (Kebede 2008, 32-36). The elite Military Academy at Harar
established in 1957 was populated mostly by students from poor families. Although military
decorum did not allow them to shout “feudal” at the King, many of its graduates were as radical
as those from UCAA or HSI University. HSI also gave priority to America’s soft-power and “lowmodernist” (as opposed to high-tech) objectives in technical assistance with a focus on “smallscale technologies and capital transfer” to improving agriculture (McVety 2008, 385), the mainstay
of over 80 percent of Ethiopia’s population. His first address to the Joint Session of Congress in
his first visit of the U.S. in 1954 makes this very clear. It made particular focus on the role the
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U.S. can play to advance Ethiopia’s education and economy (McVety 2008, 391). Although the
U.S. had some concerns about possible Soviet designs in the Red Sea and had recognized
Ethiopia’s key role in the geopolitics of the Horn, HSI did not dwell on hard-power cold-war
military dealings in his first visit to the United States in 1954.
On the American side, a major criticism was why the U.S., with all its political capital with
the Ethiopian royal government, did not bring some pressure for meaningful and lasting reforms
especially on the feudal system of land tenure. President Nixon takes some blame for ignoring
Ethiopia’s requests to ease up the crisis in Ethiopia especially as it faced a belligerent Somalia
armed by the Soviet Union. Embroiled in the Watergate scandal in 1973, Nixon was unable to
help HSI get control of the internal strife coupled with Somalia’s hostility when he last visited the
White House in May 1973 (Korn 1986, 7-8). Nixon resigned in August 1974. His successor,
Gerald Ford, was burdened by economic recession and by his domestic troubles including the
Nixon pardon, to pay that much attention to Ethiopia’s defense and economic needs (Woodward
2003, 136-142; Korn 1986, 7-21; Metaferia 2009, 61-63). HSI was removed from power that same
year.
After Jimmy Carter became President in 1977, he put forth his own “Carter Doctrine” of
international relations which was built on optimistic assumptions about “détente” with the Soviet
Union. Carter wanted to “deemphasize traditional Cold War themes”, and instead advanced “a
quiet strength” based on “nobility of ideas” to advance human rights (Jackson 2007, 4-5;
Woodward 2003, 136-142). For Ethiopian progressives, except perhaps the extreme pro-Soviet
radicals (Kebede 2008, 23-32), his otherwise noble ideas could not have come at a worse time for
Ethiopia. The country was facing its worst domestic and international challenges since the Derg
took power. A deadly “Red Terror” was underway in which a Derg-supported radical group was
dueling with another violently opposed to it with assassinations and extrajudicial killings by the
government in the streets of Addis Ababa. A national security threat was being felt from Somalia
as that country was gearing up to occupy the Ogaden. There was also a heightened hostility in
secessionist province of Eritrea. President Carter, eager to push his doctrinal point on Cold War
themes, was disinclined to help the Derg regime to obtain badly needed military hardware to
respond to the Soviet-backed provocation from Somalia. When it was faced with American
reluctance for support, the Derg quickly changed alliances and concluded an arms agreement with
the Soviet Union. A faction of the Marxist opposition, led by some of Ethiopia’s best and brightest,
most educated in the elite schools of the United States and Europe, soon joined the Derg as the
military junta opportunistically embraced Soviet communism. Other opposition groups were
classified as “counter revolutionaries” and were brutally crushed with the “Red Terror”. The Derg
downgraded its diplomatic relations with the United States in 1977, and invited the Soviets to
switch sides from Somalia into Ethiopia.
Thus, in 1977, three quarters of a century of American soft-power diplomacy in EthiopianAmerican cooperation for the modernization of Ethiopia came to a halt (Korn 1986, 23-26; Shinn
2002; Metaferia 2009, 65-70). President Carter, blindfolded by his inflexible doctrine, sadly
realized the worst case scenario in the geopolitical realignment of the Horn for the United States.
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Ethiopia was gripped by a communist regime that became one of the worst offenders of human
rights in the 20th century. The U.S. “lost” Ethiopia to the Russians, and had to counter that move
by jumping from the pan into the fire, supporting Somalia’s General Siade Barre, one of Africa’s
notorious dictators (Korn 1986, 26-46; Woodward 2003, 136-149; Lewis 2002, 226-242). Somalia
tried to use what it perceived as Ethiopia’s transitional period of weakness and invaded the Ogaden
(Woodward 2003, 65-88). With Soviet and Cuban military help, Ethiopia won the war in the
Ogaden and pushed the Somali military back into their country. As Carter’s own Secretary of
State, Zbigniew Brzezinski, put it, “detent was buried in the sands of the Ogaden” (Jackson 2007,
p. 19; Korn 1986, 26-29). So were many of the outcomes of American soft-power diplomacy with
Ethiopia for over 70 years.
Although the Derg’s brutal governance was mostly to blame for the whole debacle, the
Ethiopian radical left which backed it, at the cost of its own ignominious demise, was also
responsible (Gebrekidan 2005, 20-22; Kebede 2008, 79-81). It was also the lack of foresight by
the U.S. administration of the time which underestimated the mercurial Derg and failed to listen
to the more moderate voices of reason that its own soft-power helped inculcate (Jackson 2007;
Korn 1986, 29-46; Lewis 2002, 236-261; Nye 2004).
Ethiopia squandered an impressive modernization processes and a significant loss of its
human capital (Shinn 2002) that took over 70 years of Ethiopian-American partnership to build.
By the early 1990s, Ethiopia became so exhausted, divided and demoralized that the Derg was
incapable to hold it together and was eventually defeated by the insurgencies in two of its northern
provinces, Eritrea and Tigrai. In the aftermath, the post-Derg government in Ethiopia failed to
recapture the virtues of America’s soft-power resources that the Derg had submerged, and instead
opted to pursue a non-secular ethnic-based group-rights agenda cleverly feigning “federal”
democracy but ended up as equally hostile to democratic principles and individual freedoms
(Aalen and Tronvoll 2009). Eritrea took the option given to it by the new Ethiopian government
to secede from Ethiopia. That made Ethiopia the most populated and self-determined land-locked
country in the world (Abbai 1999). Eritrea itself became one of the poorest and most oppressive
countries in Africa (Kendie 2005, 137-165; Araya 1997; Reid 2005; Lyons 2009). Somalia, which
in 1996 had shot down U.S. helicopters, and killed over a dozen American soldiers in what was
indelibly dramatized in “Black Hawk Down”, broke up among infighting warlords and essentially
became a failed state (Lewis 2002, 262-275; Hagmann 2005; Menkhaus 2007; Holne 2006). It
has been forty years since the overthrow of HSI. Little did President Carter knew that his wellintentioned “Carter Doctrine” based on “human rights” would bring such a nihilistic resolution to
what was a more stable, if politically challenged, Horn of Africa in the mid-1970s (Abbink 2006;
Araya 1997; Lyons 2009; Perndergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007; Korn 1986, 32-46). The debacle
in the Horn is a lesson in how regressive outcomes result from a relentless pursuit of unworkable
ideological and ethnic dogmas that defy more enlightened resolutions for multiculturalism, human
rights, democratic freedoms, and socioeconomic progress.

International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014

77

Conclusion
The Ethiopian-American encounter, twenty six years after the Declaration of Independence
of the Unites States, is the oldest encounter between a New World state and an independent African
country. It started out with a historic event in New York in 1808 where Ethiopian visitors and
African Americans stood for basic principles of equality and justice. Ever since, Ethiopia served
as an icon of freedom for Africa and the African Diaspora in the Americas. Until 1903, EthiopianAmerican encounters were people-to-people relations that later culminated in storied references to
Ethiopia from abolitionists likes Frederick Douglas, intellectuals like W.E.B. Du Bois and pan
Africanists like Marcus Garvey (Gebrekidan 2005, 27-46). When agreements for official relations
between the two countries were made by Menelik II and Theodore Roosevelt in 1903, Ethiopia
was well-known among the educated elite especially in the African American community. When
Ethiopia’s independence came under threat by colonial Italy with American official relations
suspended after the death of Menelik II, Americans, especially those of African descent, stood by
the beleaguered country not only at the battlefield in Ethiopia but also at the Hague before the
League of Nations (Metaferia 2009, 35-38).
Haile Sellassie’s return from exile in 1941 and his reinstallation as King of Kings of
Ethiopia, opened a new and more dynamic chapter for Ethiopian-American relations (Ayele 2003,
61; Zewde 2001, 184-191). As his predecessor King Menelik II, Haile Sellassie’s foreign policy
for Ethiopia was to diversify her alliance outside those circumscribed by the colonial powers of
UK, France and Italy. This was exemplified by HSI’s daring overture to the Americans by his
secret trip (without the knowledge of his post-liberation British handlers) from Addis to Cairo to
visit FDR on the U.S. boat anchored off the coast of Egypt in 1945 when FDR was in the region
for the Yalta Conference. During the same trip, he also met Churchill to assure the Prime Minister
of Ethiopia’s continuing friendship with the U.K. (Vestal 2011, 36-37). HSI took advantage of
the abundance of goodwill among progressive elites in Europe (e.g. Sylvia Pankhurst in the U.K.)
as well as in the United States (e.g. Eleanor Roosevelt) for Ethiopia to benefit from the post-war
euphoria in reconstructive development. Ethiopia’s place in global politics was also restored. In
1941, it became the only member in the United Nations from Africa, and one of the first signatories
of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco in 1945. Backed by U.S., Ethiopia introduced a new currency
in 1945 which became widely accepted partly because of coins minted with silver provided by the
U.S. (Vestal 2011, 37). By the time Ethiopia and the United States elevated their diplomatic
relations to ambassadorial level in 1949, HSI had managed to build Ethiopia’s stature to
unimaginable prominence and reverence for a poor Third World country. FDR died in 1945, only
a couple of months after he met HSI and invited him to visit the US.
When HSI visited the U.S. for the first time in 1954, President Eisenhower received him at
the White House with pageantry and fanfare and honored the Ethiopian leader in his White House
address by saying “never has any company here gathered been honored by the presence in their
guest of honor of an individual more noted for his fierce defense of freedom and for his courage
in defending the independence of his people than the guest of honor this evening” (Woolley and
Peters 2011).
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Ethiopia and Haile Sellassie were accorded similar honors by Kennedy and Nixon at
successive White House visits by the King. Ethiopian-American relations between 1941 and 1977
were therefore grounded in such mutual respect and admiration. Ethiopia deserved the cordial
treatment it received because, first it was Ethiopian citizens who refused to accept racial
discrimination in the U.S. as far back as 1808 and reminded Americans of the violation of their
own covenant on human dignity; second, Ethiopia taught a lesson to the world about the dangers
of failing to respect basic principle of multilateralism by appeasement of the strong against the
weak in global diplomacy; third, Ethiopia fought heroically, a guerilla war against the Italian
occupiers to regain its independence in 1941 with the help of allied powers; four, it fully met its
UN obligations by deploying its forces in the Korean and Congo Wars; five, it helped establish
the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) and donated its headquarters in Addis
Ababa; and finally, it was successful in partnering with western powers like the U.S. to earn their
goodwill to deploy their soft-power resources in the interest of Ethiopian progress and
modernization. In the final analysis, the U.S. will find and/or has found other ways to pursue its
vital interests in the Horn of Africa. Much of it has been in hard-power diplomacy for military
defense and security especially in view of the global war on terror and America’s search for an
effective deterrent on the unorthodox geopolitical challenge. Hard-power options like the U.S.
Africa Command would claim more attention and resources than America’s vital institutions of
soft-power like the USAID, Fulbright, Peace Corps, and the defunded USIA/USIS. As Joseph
Nye pointed in his book, “wielding soft power is far less unilateral than employing hard power”
and “the United States’ most striking failure is the low priority and paucity of resources it has
devoted to producing soft power” (Nye 2004). However, of equal significance is the predisposition
of current governments in Ethiopia and others in the Horn of Africa in making smart choices
between America’s hard-power and soft-power overtures with lessons from best practices in the
past for their countries’ sustainable progress and modernization.
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From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation:
Actual and Potential Role of Stories and Storytelling Among Marginalized
Occupational Minorities in Southern Ethiopia
Federica De Sisto, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
Abstract: Throughout Ethiopia there are minority groups of craft workers and
hunters that are excluded from the mainstream society. Pottery is fundamental for
carrying water and making food, hoes and iron plough shares are essential for
agriculture; cotton cloth is indispensable for clothing; leather products are used for
transporting grain or storing. And yet, the specialized workers who produce these
items have such a low status that many of them are still considered to be “not
human” by their surrounding majorities. The phenomenon of marginalised
occupational minorities is so widespread in the country that Levine described it as
a “pan-Ethiopian cultural trait”. This paper aims at exploring the role of culture in
perpetrating the discrimination against occupational minorities and its potential to
lessen it in the societies in which they live.
Introduction
Throughout Ethiopia there are numbers of marginalized minority groups who are defined
by occupation or notional occupation. The dominant farming population articulates the social and
cultural exclusion of craft workers by giving them different labels and considering that their
profession is polluting. Members of occupational groups are known for being potters (e.g. the
Mana in Kaffa, Sheka and Dawro, the Ch'inasha in Wolaita and the Hawuda in Konso), tanners
(e.g. the Awacho of Sidama, the Degala of Dawro,), smiths (e.g. the Tumano of Kambata), weavers
(e.g. the Shamer in Gurage), woodworkers (the Fuga in Gurage) and hunters (e.g the Manjo in
Kaffa, Sheka and Dawro).
The unjust and prejudicial treatment to which these groups are subjected is manifested in
different forms or dimensions. According to Freeman and Pankhurst (2001), they are spatially
segregated, economically disadvantaged, politically disempowered, socially excluded and
culturally subordinated. These dimensions of discrimination are starkly manifested in every aspect
of daily life.
A pervasive approach to understanding occupational minorities is the caste paradigm
transposed from the Asian context. Marginalised minority groups in Ethiopia, and generally in
Africa, can be considered similar to the “untouchable” low-caste groups in India (Cerulli, 1922
and 1930; Hambly, 1930; Seligman, 1930). In the Ethiopian context the concept has been used
widely (Cerulli, 1922, 1930; Conti-Rossini, 1937; Levine, 1974), particularly to describe the social
system in the south and southwestern part of the country, where the social exclusion of these
groups is more institutionalised than in the rest of Ethiopia (Freeman and Pankhurst, 2001).
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The focus of this paper is the role of oral tradition (stories and myths), transmitted
from a generation to the next, that has played a crucial role in keeping the discrimination
still alive today but that is also the most encouraging hope for its end.
The central idea underpinning the study is that in addition to intellectual and
academic analyses of issues from many dimensions as peacebuilders, scholars and
practitioners do, there ought to be a component of the peace building process that is highly
effective in transforming attitudes and relationships. A creative tool based on the use of
local culture can fulfil this role in peacebuilding, because of its power to transform
perspectives and relationships.
The next paragraphs intend to provide an historical overview of the discrimination
of these groups throughout the Ethiopian history and to present the main features of the
societies in the south and south-western region of Ethiopia where the minorities are still
discriminated against. Lastly, the dual role of the culture as conflict bringer and potential
peace bridger will be examined.
Figure 1. Zones of the southern region of Ethiopia (Freeman and Pankhurst, 2001).
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Occupational Minorities in Southern Ethiopia
Brief History of Discrimination
During the centuries of imperial rule (up to 1974) societies in Ethiopia were divided into
high and low clans: land and slave owners, serfs, occupational groups whose status was inferior
only to the slaves. Craftsmen were classified into weavers, smiths, tanners-potters, etc. They were
held in low esteem and could simply not own land or hold political functions. Hunters assumed an
even lower position than craftsmen because of the highest level of pollution associated with them.
But the last quarter of the twentieth century has brought dramatic changes into the lives of
marginalised minorities. In 1974, the Marxist military regime known as the Dergue came into
power and tried to break down traditional hierarchies based on landholding and to create a classless
society. The ensuing land reform, which guaranteed access to land for all, had direct impact on the
minorities. Even if the marginalised groups received less land than their farming neighbours, or
land of inferior quality, this access to land provided then with the possibility of growing their own
food, thereby ensuring some degree of independence (Petros, 2003). However, the social groups
which had been particularly despised under the previous regime continued to be victims of strong
discrimination and constituted the new social minorities.
In 1991, the Dergue was overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPDRF), and the notions of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom of ethnicity’ replaced ‘socialism
and class struggle’. Ethiopia became a federal state that strongly recognized ethnic differences in
its constitution. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century, in many cases social interaction
between the dominant majority and most of the marginalised minorities has become less
constrained (e.g. there are cases of sharecropping arrangements, wage labour, joint work parties,
burial and religious associations).
Nonetheless, although both the Federal and Southern Region Constitutions contain
provisions against discrimination on the basis of social background, the current emphasis on ethnic
identity has seemingly led to a cultural revivalism in which previous values have been reasserted.
Freeman and Pankhurst (2001) report several examples of renewed discrimination. Since most of
the marginalised minorities are considered as ‘social groups’ rather than localised ethnic groups,
their concerns have hardly been considered in the new ‘ethnic politics’ (Freeman and Pankhurst,
2001, p. 336).
Social Stratification in Southern Ethiopia
Principles derived by kinship, age, and sex serve to differentiate people in different
categories in all societies. These categories are also often associated with performance of different
tasks in the division of labour in the society, and with unequal access to goods and services. Since
time immemorial, the social and political stratification of societies in Southern Ethiopia resulted
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from the arrangements of individuals into hierarchically ranked groups mutually superior
and subordinated, privileged and unprivileged according to criteria of descent and work.
Descent refers to membership to a marginalised group which is acquired by birth,
and, therefore, cannot be removed, unless one’s origin is unknown (Commission on Human
Rights, 2003). Work is linked to the occupational specialisation or functional role of
individuals or groups (United Nations High Commissioner on Human rights, 2003).
In societies which perpetrate social discrimination on the basis of descent, it is
observed that marginalised status is often associated with occupations which used to be
and still are mis-regarded or considered dirty on the basis of generationally transmitted
mythological explanations and negative stereotypes.
The Power of Stories in Conflict Transformation
Throughout time and across cultures, people have gathered in circles to join their
collective wisdom, energies and strengths binding them and guiding them into the future.
All this happens through stories that we are told and we tell ourselves. A story is anything
that tells or recounts what happened to us or people that we know (Mason, 1996). Humans
have always used stories to explain themselves to others for many different purposes: social
change, mediation, diplomacy, cross-cultural relationships building, among other reasons
(Cruikshank, 1998). Stories reflect life, our personal cultural background and the way we
elaborate identity issues and construct meaning around our experiences (Senehi, 1996).
They “…contain people in context” (LeBaron, 2003, p. 276). They may be tales or relate
to personal experiences or groups history, but they are never pure fact or fiction, they
always have meaning as through them we implicitly locate ourselves and others in this
world (Mason, 1996). When stories are told, choices are made – in how characters are
portrayed, motivations explained, and closure achieved; meanings are made explicit and
values communicated (LeBaron, 2003). The concept is repeated throughout the book. Thus
there is no specific page to be quoted). Stories can be used to socialize people and confirm
cultural values in support of peace, but can also serve to heighten cultural anxiety around
particular chosen traumas (Volkan, 1997).
The Mythical Rationale Behind Relations of Inequality: Destructive Stories
In Southern Ethiopia, in the context of historical, social, economic and political
injustices, destructive stories are the main source of discrimination against occupational
minorities. Through the recount of old stories, meanings of past generations are carried into
current groups’ perceptions; past ideas become the present culture, the only culture known
for many generations. The more stereotypes in a culture, the easier it is to form public
opinion, and the more an individual participates in that culture, the more susceptible he or
she becomes to the manipulation of these symbols. Hence, conflict becomes encoded in the
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identity of each group and becomes non-negotiable (Byrne, 2002, p. 138; Senehi, 2000).
“Misperceptions result in a lack of trust and in a deep-seated hostility that frames the conflict in a
conflict in a zero-sum intractable game between adversaries with unequal power” (Byrne, 2002,
p. 138). Destructive stories “may intensify social cleavages when they privilege some culture while
silencing others; when they generate or reproduce prejudicial and enemy images of other groups;
and when they mask inequalities and injustice, inflame negative emotions, and misrepresent
society” (Senehi ,2009, p. 203). Identities and meanings forged by misperceptions are perpetuated
as group members continue to explain others in negative ways to themselves and to other members
of their group.
The apprehension of dominant groups about relations of inequality between farmers and
craft-workers is based on account of local oral traditions, which often reflect the persisting
inequality as something that has happened by the creation of different groups. Cultural factors such
as myths and negative attributes are thus used by dominant groups to justify and perpetrate the
discrimination.
Different versions exist of the origins of marginalized occupational minorities. All the
variants, however, present in various forms share a common ground: they explain the social
groupings and differentiation as natural phenomena and present mythological justifications for the
low status of minorities. The myths portray minorities as associated with nature and the wild, or
in extreme cases, as being descendent from unions with animals. Alternatively they may be
portrayed as descending from a younger sibling with a lower status. In many cases negative myths
blame the victims.
Many are the negative stereotypes attributed to - minorities. The nature of stereotyping
varies from group to group, but some common features emerge: the marginalized are often
portrayed as being anti-social, untrustworthy, unreliable, liars, cowards, quick to anger, lacking in
morality, respect and shame. Many of the minorities have a reputation for getting drunk, singing
and dancing at market places. Their houses are described as small and shabby. Some of them are
alleged to have darker skin colour and different facial features. Those who are extremely
marginalized are considered to be polluting and unclean and not to be “real people”. The
“polluting” nature of the minorities is often explained as being a result of the “impure” meat that
they are said to eat. The meat can be either by hunted wild animals or farm animals that have died
without being slaughtered.
Whether true or not in the past, today many minorities claim that they no longer eat such
meat, although they are still suspected by the farmers to continue to do it in secret. It is not a simple
matter for members of these groups to give up their food habits to be fully accepted by the majority.
Even if they do so, tradition will prevent full acceptance (and belief that they actually have given
up) by the majority. A negative foundation for relationship has been built long time ago, robust
and resistance to change, unless something different happens to interrupt the pattern.
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Bridging Peace
Avoidance and denial of the need for searching for common ground among people
of different backgrounds cannot work indefinitely. Instead, such attitudes deepen divisions
and allow for the supporters of violent solutions to gain more power. Therefore, the task
for people who espouse the notion of peacebuilding is to vigilantly explore possibilities for
constructive conflict transformation. One strategy for bridging the gap between groups is
through the understanding and then revisioning the myths and stories upon which
individuals and groups build their identity, and which are used to justify discriminating
behaviours.
In fact, stories’ role in the transformation of worldview, identity, and relationships
can assist the change process in a positive way. Peacebuilding stories that stress positive
values in a society can help neutralize or overcome destructive stories that fan the flames
of hatred (Schirch, 2005).
Constructive stories help people recognize the connection among us, although
through our life we experience changes in relationships, roles and identities (LeBaron,
2003, concept reiterated throughout the book for this reason I don’t think there is the need
to add reference to specific pages). When a constructive story is told we experience a safe
transition from an identity to another more compassionate one, from a self-centred or
exclusive way of understanding a situation or relationship to a more open/inclusive way:
from enemies to friends, combatants to citizens, and marginalized to equals; all of this
happens in safety. The sense of security is due to the fact that the recounting of stories
happens in times outside ordinary time, when normal patterns of communication are
suspended.
The role of a third party
In the heat of conflict, parties locked in violence and entrenched positions are
usually not in the best position to think creatively. Because they are engaged in conflict, it
can be difficult for them to see a way out, as perspective is diminished and emotions run
high (Jeong, 2005).
For this reason, when the story or myth recall ancient hatred and refer to the other
side (the “enemy”) as the source of all problems, outsiders can help more than insiders in
reshaping this perception. Because they are not part of the conflict their perspective is not
affected by ancient prejudices and they are more open to different cultural ways of seeing,
and more able to guide in the passage from mutually exclusive to more reciprocally tolerant
and inclusive identities (Volkan, 1997).
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Through the revision of myths or the co-creation of stories, it becomes the mediator's or
third party's job to restate what each party has said in a way that causes less resistance or hostility.
Revision of Myths
Considering the importance of myths, their revision definitely plays a role in shaping
people’s feelings and mutual relationships. Once again, when discrimination is deeply embedded
in society, practitioners are more oriented towards the search for common ground in conflict than
insiders (Chayes and Minow, 2003). They play a crucial but delicate role in promoting coexistence
after conflict.
Hence, they can give inputs to exploring and revising myths as an important part of inviting
multiple voices into the way history is told (Smith, 1999; Volkan, 1997). This can happen by
excluding from history those myths that deny the possibility of multiple voices being heard and by
stressing the ones in favour of justice and commonality. The process can help re-imagine history
and envision a new future that does not perpetrate controversial myths connected to threatened
identities. The project undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Burundi is
an example.
In Burundi, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) decided to explain the
International Humanitarian Principle on which it is based through the words of local people. To
this purpose ICRC brought together Burundians belonging to different ethnic groups and social
classes, and over some months they were able to find in their culture saying and myths shared
across society. They made a play out of them, which was then performed “on the road”.
(Paraphrased from Anderson, 1999)
Story co-creation
Creating a story together may be done with people of all ages. Through the practice of story
co-creation, outsiders can encourage emotional intimacy among the parties in conflict and facilitate
a shift in conflict dynamics (Rousseau, Lacroix, et. al., 2005). Senehi (2002) argues that, in
situations of protracted conflicts/tensions, where people are in need of a mental reshaping in order
to recover from the polarity violence creates, listeners can learn to build relationships that are safe,
trusting, intimate, and open, through constructive storytelling. By listening to each others’ stories,
gently emphasizing respect in their storytelling, places of connection and divergence may become
clearer, leading to a better understanding of the conflict in context (LeBaron, 2003). Refocusing
the imaginations of their listeners and modelling peace, peace practitioners can reintroduce the
inner value of peace and equality to aggressors or victims of conflict, thereby providing a common
ground for reconciliation.
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This process begins with the sharing of stories by both groups and involves
acknowledging the existence of a reality other than their own and building more expansive
stories from this awareness (LeBaron, 2003). Each storyteller tailors the story and shows
the pictures in his or her mind and passes them to the listeners' minds for being interpreted
(McKay and Dudley, 1996). A good story designs “emotional bridges” because it puts the
minds of the storyteller and the audience at the same emotional level; facilitating
understanding, empathy and the creation of meaning (Senehi, 2009). The whole process
helps to understand the past, live the present and plan a shared future.
The co-creation of story is a way of humanizing conflict, and in the process,
celebrating what it means to be a human being (Senehi, 2009). Through storytelling,
‘enemies’ relearn the core human values that have been lost with months, years, decades
or centuries of antagonist behaviour.
As noted by Kyoon (2009), in the hands of skilful peace practitioners, stories can
question the status quo of hate that conflicts and violence create by questioning the moral
values of such actions. If stories are constructively told with peace in mind, the hearers can
make mental notes and judgements of the situation without any fear of threats. Justice can
take place without resistance or a perception of unfairness.
Conclusion
Discrimination is a challenging issue. To make sense of our world, we organize our
life around social norms and base our actions on values and beliefs. Sometimes these
principles can also be the basis of discrimination against others, simply because it is too
challenging to questions the principles on which we built up ourselves. From a personal
standpoint, for it becomes a critical issue whenever social discourse perpetuates
oppression. By undertaking research on the topic of the discrimination of occupational
minorities in Southern Ethiopia, I wanted to strengthen my understanding of the issue of
discrimination and explore ways to counter it. In a sense, this paper attempted to understand
and outline a response to cultural violence which constitutes the root cause of the divisions
and injustice that lead to the barriers for social groups in Southern Ethiopia to renegotiate
shared meanings. In asymmetrical societies built on historical, social, economic and
political injustices, oral tradition is the main source of discrimination but also the most
encouraging hope for its end (Senehi, 1996). If a conflict stems from culture, solving the
conflict involves coming back to culture. Cultural components forge our personal and
social identity and contribute to peace-prone or conflict-prone attitudes. Stories and myths
become a means to undermine the adversaries and are responsible for the creation of
discriminatory behaviour and for its continuation across generations and centuries. If
culture is the source of conflict, then local actors are immersed in it and their worldview
has been built upon social injustices. People from outside the conflict have a more impartial
perspective and may be able to re-enhance human rights principles forgotten in the culture.
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Digging into myths, they can better understand different positions in conflict and then find the
least intrusive way to change individuals’ and groups’ worldview. By listening to group stories
they can help in co-creating new shared stories between adversaries. However, it is important to
acknowledge that the use of this cultural heritage does not have to replace other tools for conflict
transformation. Rather, it is a supplement to traditional “front-door” approaches to conflict that
deal with issues in direct, rational and linear modes.
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